Seminar1

Today’s class was different class from ordinal one. It was just explanation of the seminar of the class. This was why the teacher was different. But her English was quite good.

The points of the seminar for me were following:

1. Talk does not mean credibility
If two players talk before the game, it does not always mean they can reach efficient equilibria. If there is one Nash equilibria, they can reach the equilibria. But if there are two equilibrias, it does not always reach the most efficient one. This is because payoff and credibility are different thing.

2. In stage game, we have to guess about the relation between them
If the game has several stages, there are some relations between them. We have to guess about it even if it is not mentioned. It becomes possible to make integrated game table.

By the lecture, I learned I had missed a lot of things about glossary of game theory. These are following:

Bayesian game:
The game the information is incomplete, but each player knows probability of opponent’s behavior.

Bayesian Nash equilibria:
The equilibria that maximize each player’s expected value.

Perfect Bayesian equilibria(PBE):
Subgame perfect Nash equilibria(Subgame perfect equilibria) in incomplete information

Mixed strategy equilibria:
The correction of probabilities of strategies.

Subgame perfect Nash equilibria(Subgame perfect equilibria):
The definition in dynamic games and it represents a Nash equilibrium of every subgame of the original game.