Lecture 13: Coordination Problems

Today’s lecture was the last lecture. It was about coordination problems; matching players to achieve efficient outcomes. This is an area of incentive problems.

Multiple Payoff-equivalent Equilibria:
This is a kind of meet friend game(if they meet with each other in the same place, they will be happy otherwise, not. And the place is indifferent)
To attain coordination, we can use sequentially decision, communication, third-party recommendation, and convention.

Multiple Payoff-ranked Equilibria:
This is a kind of previous case, but one place is better than the other. In this case, pure strategy equilibria is same.

Payoff vs Risk(Stag hunt)
Consider previous game + Chicken(two same strategies’ pares are indifferent, and the others are only one player gets outcome).
There are two equilibriums. One is Pareto-dominant, the other is risk-dominant(because if one does not want to get Pareto-dominant equilibrium, one can make sure to get at least something slightly lower than Pareto-dominant equilibrium) there is two ways to attain coordination.
self-signaling:
action is an action chosen partly to secure good news about one’s traits or abilities, even when the action has no causal impact on these traits and abilities.
Self-commitment:
To show willingness to do something.

In this game, it is difficult to know what was perceived by other people.
Coordination on efficient outcomes is reached often with two-side communication, less often with one-sided communication, and very rarely without communication.

Without communication, if third party(public) suggestion is given, they can accept the suggestion if it is efficient equilibria, but otherwise, not.

Weak-Link Games:
Each player’s payoff is determined by the own choice and minimum of opponents’ choice.
For any number of players, there are 7 pure strategy equilibria(each player chooses same number in games)

Evidences:
By experiments, if number of player is increasing, the outcome become worse(because people think there are someone to choose 1).
Moreover, Increasing specialization(team size) can be dangerous. Raise team size only gradually, after having coordinated on a good outcome.

Organizational Languages:
Player: manager and workers
Rule: in 20 round, a manager teaches a worker a order of 8 of 16 pictures. And after that, half of workers join other managers’ pair and taught same thing as other workers do.

Result:
Over first 20 rounds, an efficient and relationship specific language develops (experienced workers are better than inexperienced)

It shows mergers lead to short-run loss of performance(of more than 25%), because of language mismatch.
We can say subjects overestimate value of mergers; they guessed that completion times would not decline so much.
Subjects attributed part of the decline to inefficient newcomers: workers rate new managers worse than old; managers rate new workers worse. Despite understanding that their task is harder (in this experiment, the work itself is same)

Multiple Efficient Equilibria;
“Battle of sexes”
(payoff matrix is like a chicken game, but two equilibriums are indifferent; one is good for one, another is good for another person), but if each of them choose same strategy, they get nothing.

In this game, one-side communication usually reach coordination.
Two-side communication, coordination achieved in 55% of cases if one round of communication; three round is 63%.
Without communication, coordination in 48% of cases.

Authority:
Formal authority: label(King, Boss)
Real authority is an equilibrium outcome

The label(boss, king) indicates that subordinates are supposed to play according to the authority’s directives, and to ignore competing massages from others(If players are given the role of king or servant, they can reach agreement easier than no role)

Remarks:
Labels only affect play if some convention(like the above) is attached.
A player has real authority if all others play the suggested equilibrium.
Formal authority is worthless absent real authority.
Authority only admits choice of equilibrium(do not affect strategy or payoff itself)

Absolute Authority:
The right a player can induce her preferred equilibrium.
If a player has absolute authority, efficient equilibrium is often not achieved because the player does not have credibility.

Divided Authority:
Magna Carta, and the Glorious Revolution gives king better position. Division of power can make everyone stronger by strengthening their commitment abilities.

Lecture12: Bounded Rationality

Today's subject was another type of economic psychological theory; bounded rationality. For bounded recall, the teacher told us relation of memory in Prisoners’ Dilemma, Tid-for-tat strategy, indirect reciprocity. As for Self-serving bias, he mentioned about some experiments and field study. Finally, he treated Time Inconsistency using three period models. What was interesting for me was he mentioned about similarity between economics and biology in the argument of “organization”. That was exactly what I thought!

Bounded recall:
This is a supplement of memory for game because memory is important for institutional solution to incentive problems. In fact, in the repeated two-player prisoners’ dilemma, needed memory is only one period.

Example: Sequential Prisoners’ Dilemma
Player: 1 and 2
Rules: choose C or D, repeatedly
Payoff: U(C,C) U(C,D) U(D,C) U(D,D)
Outcome: U(C,C)=a U(C,D)=b U(D,C)=c U(D,D)=d
C=cooperates, D=defets

Strategies:
Tit-for-tat(TFT): do always others do
TFT is stable when δ is sufficiently large, but it is vulnerable if there is some mistakes to choose. A better strategy is forgiving TFT. Even better is WSLS(Win-Stay Lose-Shift). This means first one sets a target of his payoff, and if the payoff is higher than the target, he stays. Otherwise, he change. If constant positive probability another round isδ>a/b, it is ESS(Evolutionary Stable
Strategy; the strategy to reach maximization without other hypothesis, and Nash equilibrium that can explain social evolution.)

Indirect Reciprocity:
When players switch partners often, with reputation across interactions, cooperation is sustainable. To consider (i) cooperate unless the opponent is known defector, (ii) always defect, necessary condition for cooperation in equilibrium is q>a/b). but of course, one-period memory of actions does not quite suffice because we do not see types, only behaviors.

The justification of government:
According to David Hume, the reasons for needs of government are:
(i) People do not have impartial view
(ii) People cannot plan for long time
(iii) There are public goods

Self-serving Bias:
Agents may have self-serving interpretations of fairness.

Tort Case Experiment:
Self-biased leads disagreement, and if they know each other the rate of impasses become smaller.

A field study:
Public school teacher’s negotiation.
Both employers and teachers use wages in comparison districts as argument, but the comparison is biased. Incidence of strikes is related difference in comparison group. A solution is to add some teacher to board, or to adapt job rotation.

Time inconsistency:
Even a single person may have problems making credible commitments to herself:
The reason for prohibitions is for the merit of a person who wants to do such things.

Time inconsistent model:
U=u(c0)+βΣδu(ct) (if δ<1, the agent is time inconsistent. And δ=1, it is the same as conventional model: U=Σδu(ct))

If taken three period model, Utility is
U= In c1 + βδInc2 +βδ2Inc3
Total income is Y. Suppose interest rate is zero, then
C1+c2+c3-Y=0

Case(i); Full Commitment
Optimization through three period
Case(ii): No Commitment
Consider c3*=Y-c1-c2, c2+c3=Y-c1, and solve c1* to maximize period 1.

If there is no commitment, consumption is higher in Period 2 and lower in Period 3. and if the agents cannot commit, he is worse off. Suppose if politician propose a compulsory pension scheme forcing people to consume less in period 2 and more in period 3. Politician will be elected because they want someone to force them save money for period 3.

Another implications:
1. Why people save illiquid assets:
People want something force them to save money
2. Why they borrow and save simultaneously
People want something force them to save money
3. Why consumption drops heavily at retirement
People views spot time utility optimization
4. Why people agree to ban drugs and prostitution
People thinks it is good for themselves even if they want to do so.
5. Xenical and Antabus
People want to diet or be healthy even if they do not try

Dual Process Mind?
Ambiguity aversion and loss aversion.
There are two ways to decide: instinctive and cognitive
Analyzing dual-self model: long-run/short-run self: period 1 is much and 2 and 3 is less.

Credibility

Today was the last lecture of Business English. Two DCS and two LIP. They were great, actually.

Last individual presenter was a girl who was good at previous presentations. Actually, her presentation was not as good as my expectation. But everyone listened carefully, and that made an active discussion after that. I thought that credibility is important for all situations.

After the lecture, I asked teacher about how to study English in Japan. He told me three things. Read English books, watch DVD spoken in and written in English, and join some conversation in English. Actually, these are great way to study.

I will keep studying English, and in the next study abroad, I will become like English-Japanese.

Sum up the lecture

Sum up the lecture

Today was the last lecture of Sustainable Management. At the first part, teacher said she was disappointed about our poor participation in the course. That was true, but it was difficult to discuss about sustainability, especially in her class, I thought…

Any way, she summarized the structure of the lecture. It was interesting for me. The lecture consisted;

1. Concept:
Concept of Sustainability

2. Business:
CSR, conduct
sustainable market and enterprize
supply chain, customers sustainability
sustainable leadership
financial market and cooperate responsibility

3. Standerize:
social entrepreneur
reporting
social standard

4. Poverty reduction:
poverty reduction


From the all over the course, I learned three things about sustainability.

First is complexity of network. To consider sustainability, we have to look supply chain, from raw material to customer, even to recycle. Network becomes more complex and more long-term, and communication become more and more important.

Second is standardization. To make communication efficient, a system of certification is needed. It should be international one. And in terms of financial market, sustainability should be evaluated. This generates some report of CSR, and indexes.

Last one is poverty reduction. Ultimately, sustainability relates poverty and developing countries because the concept of sustainability is global, and one of the biggest polluters in the future world will be developing countries.

At the same time, I leaned that there are not solid method or theory in sustainability. I do not know why, but I think “sustainability” should not be an independent subject, should be one theme of some business administration because there is some trade-off in real and theory, and sustainability is only theory and ideals.

Sustainable Finance

Today's lecture was hold by a PhD. student. But actually, she was better than the teacher, I thought because of English wise and knowledge of student's attitudes.

It was kind of a presentation in Business English class. Someone complained that she told only knowleage in the paper for the lecture, but for me, it was interesting.

The way to evaluate social investment:
*avoidance screening(negative screening)
*positive screening(choose best in industry, or bench mark)
(these are done by questionaires and talks)

The influence of shareholders:
*amplify external pressure on corporations
*legitimize CSR in the corporation
*take part in shaping norms about CSR overtime

I thought, CSR is a product for social investment.



And from the paper that the teacher presented us, I learned "system view"
That is the way to think sustaibability, social value in long term.

1. To understand the source of change
2. To predict the effect of the source to each external factor
3. To integrate each factor and imagine interaction between them

Sustainability is most difficult problem we have ever seen, I felt. But it means it is most interesting object at the same time.

Lecture 11: Social and Non-materialistic Preferences

In real world, there are more factors than simple pay-off. This is the lecture which justifies those factors.

Reciprocity: give and take
Trust: belief of goodness for someone

Interpretations:
1. Trust and positive reciprocity: You can trust me because I reward you
2. Trust and negative reciprocity: I trust because I punish you if you do not reward
3. Trust and reputation: You can trust me because my valuable reputation is at stake
4. Trust and reliability: You can trust me because I can optimize in this way in the game

Example 1: the Dictator game
Players: a dictator and a recipient
Rules: the dictator distributes 100 unit of money(M) to the recipient
Outcomes: distribute M, receive M
Payoffs:100-M, M

Surprisingly, most of the class choose 50!

Example 2: the trust game
Players: 1 and 2
Rules: if 1 chooses T, its payoff of (1, 2)=(20,20). If 1 chooses T and 2 R, its payoff is (25,25), if 2 does N, it is (15,30)
Outcomes: NT, (T,N),(T,R)
Payoffs(20,20),(15,30),(25,25)

In pure incentive theory, only (15,30) can be choose. But considering positive reciprocity, (25,25) can be chosen.

Example3:the mini-ultimatum game
Players: 1 and 2
Rules: if 1 chooses F, its payoff of (1, 2)=(20,20). If 1 chooses U and 2 chooses A, its payoff is (80,20), if 2 chooses P, it is (0,0)
Outcomes: F, (U,A),(U,P)
Payoffs(50,50),(80,20),(0,0)

Example4:Involuntary trust and ultimatum games
Players: 1 and 2
Rules:1 already chose T, 2 can choose N or R
Outcomes: N,R
Payoffs(15,30),(25,25)

Players: 1 and 2
Rules:1 already chose T, 2 can choose A or P(=punish)
Outcomes: A,P
Payoffs(80,20),(0,0)

Fairness is one of factors to influence our decision.

Models(fairminded)

ui=mi－ψi*f(lmj-mil)

-mi is agent i’s net monetary payoff and j is not i
-ψi is non-negative parameter
-f is an increasing function

But it can not fully explain the reason of player 2’s action or popularity of 50:50.
Extensions of the fairness models are
*worthy audience
*signaling
*both

Example: Esteem for fairmindedness
???

In resent biology and psychology, human’s preference is hot issue. But reciprocity is one of biggest solution.

a negative aspects of positive evaluations

Today’s lecture was also Longer Individual Presentation.　There were four presentation about presentation skills, mafia, JPmorgan, and DLA Norgic. Interestingly, every presentation has same outline, introduction, agenda, contents(What, Why, How), conclusion. I think it is caused by the fact here is an economic focus school.

Familiar comments were amount of information. Someone said that information on slide was too much to understand. I was commented same thing. I thought, especially in not native language presentation, not linguistic communication is important.

Actually, I felt boring in some presentation because they did not put their effort on presentation. But no one pointed that because we had to say only positive comments. I think this―cannot discover core of problem―was the biggest shortcoming of positive evaluation.

Asymmetric information 3: post contract

Even under a symmetric information, there can be private information about either:
What the agents do
The outcome of agents’ actions
The relevant circumstances facing the agents

In contracts, there are three trade-offs
1. incentives vs risk sharing( we will focus on this)
2. incentives vs rent extraction
3. incentive power vs incentive balance

And three solutions:
1. monitoring
2. incentive contracts
3. regulation (task design)

Model: principle(an employer) and agent(an worker)

Player: a risk neutral employer, a risk averse worker.
Rules:
Worker’s action is unobservable to the employer, only the outcome can be observed.
w wage = α＋βz
e effort
z observed outcome (profit) = e+x
x random variable (mean zero)
r measure of (absolute) risk aversion (worker not only care about wage but also care about risk)
C(e) workers’ disutility of effort
u(worker’s ulitity) is wbar-1/2*rVar〔ｗ〕

Outcomes:
The agent’s utility is
UA=α＋β(e+x)- C(e) -1/2*rVar〔α＋β(e+x)〕=α＋βe- C(e) -1/2*r2Var〔x〕
(because mean x is zero, andαand e is constant)
The principle utility is
UP=e-(α＋βe)
Method to optimum:
We should get β becauseα can allocate surplus in any desired way.
We want to maximize UA+UP
Two steps:
(i) Find the agent’s optimal choice of e for anyβ
β-c”(e)=0
(ii) Find principal’s optimal choice ofβ
Considering about (i), UA+UP = e-C(e)-1/2*r(C”(e))2Var〔x〕
(iii) find the condition which maximize UA+UP by differentiation.
e-C(e)-1/2*r(C”(e))2Var〔x〕is 1-C”(e)-rC”(e)C””(e)Var〔ｘ〕＝0
UsingC“(e)= β, this condition can be rewritten as
β=1/(1+rC““(e)Var〔ｘ〕)
Emprics:
(i)CEO’s saraly positively relate to his firm’s stock return.
(ii)For low return variability, the number is 20-25, and for high variability, it is around 2-5.
In general, CEO’s salary should connect to not only firm’s performance but also depend on negatively industries performance. but in reality, CEO’s salary is positively related industries performance but if there is big share holder, the relation becomes weaker.

Other extensions:
Multiple tasks: Incentive power vs incentive balance
( if focus on one measure, it breaks the balance of incentive)
Monitoring
Multiple agents
-yardstick competition(ideal competition among different markets)
-credibility and tournaments

Appendix: Informativeness Principle and Filtering

Suppose pay can be made own output and competitor’s output.
z is own output = e+x
z2 is competitor’s = e2＋y
w is wage = α＋βｚ＋γｚ２

the worker’s expected utility is then
UA= α＋β(e+x)＋γ（ebar2+ybar）-C(e)-1/2rVar〔α＋β(e+x)＋γ（ebar2+y）〕
= α＋βe＋γebar2-C(e)-1/2r(β2Var〔x〕＋γ2Var〔y〕＋2βγCov〔x、y〕)

The problem is to chooseγso as to minimize
γ2Var〔ｙ〕＋２βrCov〔x,y〕

First order condition is

2γVar〔y〕+2βrCov〔x,y〕=0

Is γ=－βCov〔x、y〕/Var〔y〕

Asymmetric Information 2:post-contract and common values

This case is which buyer and seller knows a common value( not exactly each value, but a correlation to each value). Oil field is one example because oil price is common for all.

Signaling is costly and just a waste, but desirable. For example, price, education, gifts, non-profit, freedom, wages, and so on.

Example1: price and quality signal
Player: seller and quality sensitive customers(S), and quality insensitive customers(I)
Rule: two products: high quality and low quality.
High: cost is 1, value for S is 6, value for I is 5
Low: cost is 3, value for S and I is 4
Outcomes:
1. when quality is known:>efficient???

Example2:Education
Player: productive workers(P), unproductive workers(U)
Rule: P’s productivity is 2, and Us’ is 1. the productivity is privately known and cannot be revealed costlessly. Education shows their productivities. It costs 1/p.
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium which satisfies plausible restriction on out-of-equibrium beliefs.
Outcomes:
P takes education at a cost of 1/2, U takes nothing.

Terms:
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium:
Bayesian Equilibrium in dynamic games.

Intuitive Creterion:
This is the method to eliminate multiple PBE. If there are deviation to improve payoff, it can be removed if it is Nash Equilibrium.

Pooling Equilibrium:
an equilibrium where senders with different types all choose the same message.

Separating equilibria:
an equilibrium where senders with different types choose different messages.

Example3: Gifts

Player: A and B
Rule: A wants to befriend with B, and it values 1 or 2. B wants to befriend with A only if A’s value is 2. Only A knows his value for friends.
Outcome: A can bring a gift to B.
Even if the gift is worthless for B, A would give the gift because it represents A’s value for friend is 2.

Example4: Effective wages(completely hard to understand…)

Player: employer, worker
Rule: employer has two job; good and bad. Good job’s productivity is qh, and bad one’s is ql. Worker can invest human capital p=qe. Employment is for two periods. In period 1,
Payoff:worker gets w, offered by employer, and in period 2, worker gets βqe where β<1/2(why?)
Outcome: in the least costly separating equilibrium, the employer offers w=o if q=ql, and w=(1-β) β(qh-ql)ql, if q=qh.

Keys:
(i) what is the effort given the worker’s belief about q?
(ii) how much must the good employer type pay to prove qh?

Asymmetric Information 1:pre-contract

Example1:Selling One Unit
Asymmetric information for seller
c = seller’s cost (publicly known)
v = buyer’s value (privately known)
p = offer price
F(p) = the probability that v is lower than p
seller guesses buyer’s value as distribution(here, we assume it is uniform on interval 〔0,vbar〕
seller’s optimal strategy is to make the offer p which maximizes benefit of seller

(p-c)(1-F(p))=(net profit)(probability that v is higher than p)=(p-c)(1-p/vbar)

And p=(c+vbar)/2 maximizes it. But it is inefficiently high.

This mechanism is:
It is difficult for seller to optimize their benefit. And if seller cannot perfectly commit, it is also difficult to optimize. But If buyer makes offer, it is easy to optimize.

If seller has multiple units, he can make more money through quantity discounts. If so, the price for a low number of units will be inefficiently high.

Example2: Red Tape and Corruption

Player: entrepreneurs(E) and bureaucrat(B)
Rule:
B sells licenses to E, and it values 10 for E
E’s wealth is privately knowledge w=10(probability q), w=5(probability 1-q)
B’s price is 5 (if q<0.5), and 10 (if q>0.5)
B have red tape which impose additional cost t to E, but no cost for B.
With red tape t=5, B can charge a price of 5, and charge a bribe of 5-e.
E’s expecting wealth is
Without red tape
If q<0.5
:10-5=5
If q>0.5
:10+10q+5(1-q)-10=5q+5
Outcome
Payoff

Result: red tape is profitable.


Case: Oil Field Organization
If there are common pool problem, it predicts
(i) Excessive drilling
(ii) More concentrated ownership leads to smaller inefficiencies

And it was almost proved in different number of owner and different jurisdictions.

Tutoring

Today we had a tutorial for term paper of Sustainable Management. It was quite better than I had expected.

Before discussion, I was so anxious about what to ask and first of all, what was our main point, because our plan was so broad and abstract. What was worse, I could not express fully about that.

In the tutoring, we decided to focus on adaptation of household level energy generation in EU. First, one member represented we would focus on renewable resources, and this conversation lead the question “what is needed for adaptation of clean energy”. Next, one member stated household solar energy, and it lead private energy generation. And after that, teacher suggested us to focus on EU.

It was too good to be true because before the tutoring, Ian said he did not have any idea. I guess he planed to find some way in tutoring because if teacher agreed, it was easy to persuade other members. I leaned a lot about team management in this class.

sustainability and leadership

Today’s class was the worst class in my study in SSE. One of the reason was I did not read required article, but mainly it is caused by teacher’s skill.

The topic was so abstract, and contents had nothing new.

But I leaned something from the lecture:

1, concept of exampler: association needs leader, manager, and exampler.
2, students who are active has good preparation: I seated next a girl who gave opinion in every lecture. She read quite well and underlined a lot. It was great surprise for me, but it was natural for students.
3, likes attracts likes: I think the quality of guest was quite low. This caused by the teacher because in last term’s lecture, all guest were good and teacher was also great.

From next time, I will read and prepare for discussion!

Longer Individual Presentation

Today’s Business English was only Longer Individual Presentation, and this was my turn!

About my presentation, I got following comments:

bad
1. look script so much
2. too much information in one slide(characters are small)
3. topic is little more complex

good
1. good voice
2. good slide and color
3. hand action

Most impressive thing for me was everyone gave me comment after presentation, not question. I want to say thank you for everyone in class.


About other people’s presentation, what I felt was familiarity is important because it causes discussion with individual opinion. One of today’s topic was consuming attitudes and it caused interesting discussions.

Any way I have derived from big task, so I am happy now.

Nozick feedback

Today’s English class was Nozick feedback and longer individual presentation. In lecture I did not know the word “punctuation”=reading mark, but now I got it.

Nosick feedback:
1. long sentence can be divided by punctuation, or put the mark of illustration before the long part.
2. capitalism opposition> opposition to capitalism
3. If we… sometimes lacks subject. If we > let us
4. difference between OO, which/who XX, and OO which/who XX is that, former means all OO are XX, but latter limits OO only which/who is XX.
5. reason for one’s –ing or why S+V, strive(=to make a great effort to achieve)> aim
6. after ;, we can use capital if the sentence follows is long.
7. however should not be used in sentences, but can used with , , or first and last

Longer Individual presentation:
1. why/what/how are important
2. figure is standard of business communication
3. good chance is not necessary to say


present= give a gift (not represent)


About feedback of my assignment, I found there are many absences of “the”. And even Soviet Union, an unique object, needs “the”.

And there are some spelling mistake and chose of word such as present( not represent).

I will try to care about them.

stable and reliable

Today’s lecture was all individual presentation. I tried to look carefully for preparation of my presentation. Here are some points:

Tone: should corresponds with characters, and atmosphere. But energetic does not always mean good.
Theme: should have some connection for listener.
New info: should be included in presentation.
Standing: stably is important.
Question: should be presented first.
Picture: is better to have some caption
Character: too small is hard to see

I noticed that listeners were always feeling boring. That was big problem…

After the lecture, I asked some question about last assignment. Here are answers for the questions.

Improvement vs improving: -ing is used to express activity.
Equal to vs equal as: to is directly same, as is indirectly such as property of someone.
Stable vs reliable: stable is about quantity, and reliable is about quality.

I will make my presentation now!

Figure, Reason, Point, Before view

Today’s lecture should have been team presentations, but actually was not. This was twice that I misunderstood the obligation of presentation. But it was not bad, because I got an opportunity to improve my presentation.

Today’s lecture style was orthodox: first was summary of the case, and discussion about that. But what I could not understand was she divided class into three, not into group that prepared some presentation, and gave each group each role such as product manager, and started to discuss about the case. I thought this way was inefficient because we can not necessarily express the opinion which was made by group, and ultimately this group preparing and non-group lecture made the quality of discussion lower.

But, of course, there was some positive aspects about that. One was it made clear characters and opinions of individual students. What was more, the discussion confused in two positions; promote organic cotton, and not care about organic. The discussion was interesting because it told me how to express my opinion, and what is good speech.

From this lecture, I learned four things:

Figure: In discussion, or business communication, figure is important and only information we can rely on. For example, figure about distribution, money, time, are most important figures.

Reason: It is also important for discussion. Opinion itself is no value, and reason is true value because there is no room to inspect opinion without reason.

Point: To grasp key factor is important in the premise of figure and reason. For example, what is competitive advantage for a firm.

Before view: This is overlook of discussion. There are some question and requirement for discussion, but before that, to see broadly is more important. For example, in the case of H&M, organic cotton is used by only 1%, it means it might be waste of time to discuss organic cotton.

Globalization opposes Sustainability

Today’s sustainable management was first “lecture”. The theme of the lecture was Sustainable Supply Chain, and teacher explained this from company’s view and customer’s view.

From company:
Most impressive was the fact that globalization opposes sustainability. Globalization necessarily increases transportation, and distance between customer and production of goods. It means more consumption of fuels, concealment of negative information such as child labor or environmental destruction. And ultimately, the goal of the sustainable supply chain is to reduce resources; opposite to marketing.

From customer:
Sustainable Supply Chain means changes of lifestyle for customer. But it also opposition of economy; large consumptions and large productions for growth.


About presentation:
From her presentation, I leaned followings;
Common knowledge is waste of time
Slide should be formatted for efficient information
Credibility is important for attention
Sustainability is naturally boring area for students, because we do not know contradiction to environment in business situation; the core of this area.

gramatical problem

Today's class consisted of DCS and excercises of gramatical mistake in English writing.
followings are some points:

DCS:
*Voice is important(do not read, but tell)
*hand is also important
*familiarity(closeness to topic for listener)
*small paper is good
*last is "thank you for listening"

Excercise:
divide sentences(use some connecting, and find each subject)
*, and or .(full stop)
*Having +++ed,
*since is because + time

make formal:
*other guys>competitors
*are dying>be looking forward to
*great>rewarding
*flop>not beeing successful
*crazy about>very enthusiastic about

find less word:
a check in the amount of $10> a check for $10
along the lines of> like
in reference to > about
in regard to > about
viable to the eye > visible
will you be so kind as to > please

Information does not mean informative, and evaluation is made by audience not by presenter.

Today’s lecture was “Longer Individual Presentation”. I looked forward about that because it was informative for the preparation of my presentation.

Important points;
1. If there is some relation, a topic is interesting
2. an agenda is necessary if contents are complex
3. balance of atmosphere(self image) and topic is important

Daniel;
It has clear structure and simple topic. It was many information, but I could not notice that. And costume is also good.

Niklas;
One slide was good.

Yoshi;
There is too much information in one presentation.


I thought, information does not mean informative, and evaluation is made by audience not by presenter.

Microfinance and study

Today's lecture was guest lecture, Lin Lerpold, Assistant Professor of SSE. She has many experiences both in business and academic. However, I felt her lecture was less interesting than I thought.

The lecture was well organized because we did many things, understanding a basic mechanism of Microfinance, describing challenges of Hand in Hand, and group work and presentation. In the introduction, she talked about five points of microfinance:

1. Peer Selection; lending to group
2. Peer Monitoring; monitor through the group
3. Dynamic incentive; start small lend, and it becomes bigger if repayment is satisfied.
4. Regular Repayment Schedule; repayment is done regularly immediately after lending
5. Collateral Substitute; there is no collateral, but have immediate fund that is 0.5% of loan as the substitute of collateral.

Next, we discussed about a case of Hand in Hand. There were too many activities that Hand in Hand was taking. Her explanation was this was typical type of NGOs because if they want to expand Microfinance, social infrastructure is needed such as school, citizen center, environment, and health and medical care. It was quite interesting point, and for me, it was also interesting to discuss more about confliction of vision and efficiency.

After that, we divided into five groups and did role play taking a role in a group. It was so excited because one of students were from India and had experience to work in a NGO. He said collecting donation is easy and hiring people also easy. But finding right people is difficult and sometimes there are scandals for NGO, such as farmer’s suicides.

About presentation of each group, there was nothing special. Of course, every presentation was clever and each has good information, but it is not real, meaningless to discuss a lot. I think this was the reason why the Indian student seemed to feel boring in the lecture. By the way, English fluentness was much important I felt…