K.S. Nilsson(2004)”The (Ir)responsible Organization―Argumentative Themes in the Literature on Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Citizenship
This is the study for CSR or Corporate Citizenship(CC). this paper arranged arguments that were taken place in this matter. The discussion in the paper shows two aspects of CSR and CC: conflict of interest between opponents and proponents regarding merit and drawbacks of CSE and CC. Clashes are caused by sub-groups.
However, this paper also shows CSR and CC are influenced by institutional form of organization. And the social activities end up cementing, rather than changing, hypothesis of profit maximization.
Q what is CSR and CC?
Q what is the difference of Institutional setting?
Q why profit maximization is bad( from the view of author)?
Wednesday, 5 November 2008
Tuesday, 4 November 2008
EU presentation
Today’s class was EU presentation. Funny thing is that , one group has completely same topic as us.
The point of presentation were: eye contact, eyesight(slide or presenter), self-confidence, and harmonization of tension!
After presentation, we had a meeting about presentation. It was so fun because the members were great!!!
I am looking forward to presentation!!!
The point of presentation were: eye contact, eyesight(slide or presenter), self-confidence, and harmonization of tension!
After presentation, we had a meeting about presentation. It was so fun because the members were great!!!
I am looking forward to presentation!!!
Repeated game and governnance
Today’s class was so hard to follow. I did not know why, but I have understood the reason, lack of vocabulary.
Any way, today’s class was also interesting, as I feel now. Today’s topics were three: Institutional Change, Repeated Games, Organization of Punishment.
Institutional Change:
Expand Hold-up model to be followed one simple game. And assume connection between interactions is all in the players’ heads. In the game, there are many strategies. And the strategies can be written as (I, if E the T; if NE the T).
Repeated Games:
To repeat the institutional change, there is difference between outcome of finite game and infinite game. But, here, we calculate payoffs of infinite game. This shows possible value of δ(=discount factor), r(=immediate cost of punish), p(=imposed cost of robber).
Organization of punishment:
This is indication for revenge and third party’s enforcement to change rules. Of course, it is possible to reach effective equilibrium by revenge, but professional enforcement is reasonable because of its scale merit. It means professional enforcer easily sustain natural monopoly. And calculation shows the value of f(=fee for enforcer).
These shows the lessons: Better governance required several players changing their worldview, memory of past events, foresight that current actions will be remembered and shape behavior in the future. However, in the simple stationary environments, cooperation requires only a little memory and no foresight. Of course more complex situation needs more memory and anticipation or communications.
Any way, today’s class was also interesting, as I feel now. Today’s topics were three: Institutional Change, Repeated Games, Organization of Punishment.
Institutional Change:
Expand Hold-up model to be followed one simple game. And assume connection between interactions is all in the players’ heads. In the game, there are many strategies. And the strategies can be written as (I, if E the T; if NE the T).
Repeated Games:
To repeat the institutional change, there is difference between outcome of finite game and infinite game. But, here, we calculate payoffs of infinite game. This shows possible value of δ(=discount factor), r(=immediate cost of punish), p(=imposed cost of robber).
Organization of punishment:
This is indication for revenge and third party’s enforcement to change rules. Of course, it is possible to reach effective equilibrium by revenge, but professional enforcement is reasonable because of its scale merit. It means professional enforcer easily sustain natural monopoly. And calculation shows the value of f(=fee for enforcer).
These shows the lessons: Better governance required several players changing their worldview, memory of past events, foresight that current actions will be remembered and shape behavior in the future. However, in the simple stationary environments, cooperation requires only a little memory and no foresight. Of course more complex situation needs more memory and anticipation or communications.
Monday, 3 November 2008
M.R. Garfinkel and S. Skaperdas (2006): Economics of Conflict: An Overview, in T. Sandler and K. Hartley(eds.): Handbook of Defense Economics volⅡ(for
This is a chapter of a book. The central focus of this chapter is to identify the effects of conflict on economics outcomes. The examination in the paper shows conflict is a natural consequence of basic economic assumptions. And the conflicts involves costs are important, and effects allocation of resources.
Q
-details implication?
-governments roles
Q
-details implication?
-governments roles
S.Skaperdas(1992):”Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights
This is a paper to examine interaction without property rights. The paper sets two patterns: first is possibility of cooperation and its characteristics is static setting. When the agents cooperate, conflict is ineffective. It is when win probabilities are significantly different only for large arm differentials and, in addition, when their marginal production is similar. Cooperation can be consistent with domination of one party.
As for power, the more resources agent has, the less power it has because of less productibity.
The elements of coalition are difficult to identify. It can be found only by drastic simplification.
Q
-what is “consistent with domination”?
-what is second?
-how to set environment?
As for power, the more resources agent has, the less power it has because of less productibity.
The elements of coalition are difficult to identify. It can be found only by drastic simplification.
Q
-what is “consistent with domination”?
-what is second?
-how to set environment?
Bayesian Equilibrium
Today’s class was so short. But it was so interesting!
The contents of the class were three: multi-stage games and subgame perfection, Bayesian Equilibrium, and Anarchy economy.
Multi-stage games:
The games are where players act in turns. In the class setting, there were two Nash equilibria. But only one of them was reasonable. This subgame perfection can be checked by backward induction.
Bayesian Equilibrium:
We often can not know each other’s payoff because we do not always know other’s payoff and non-monetary issues. But if we assume each player can assign probability distribution to other’s payoffs, we can use the concept of Nash equilibrium. This is Bayesian Equilibrium. In Bayesian Equilibrium, players choose best strategy according to (other’s payoff probability)・(its payoff).
Anarchy economy:
This is opposition concept of perfect market. There are two players. Each one has one unit of labor. They can produce food and weapons. Weapons are used to protect and acquire foods. Only food consumption is valued. Suppose “might(=power) is right”, whoever has most weapons takes all food, the equilibrium outcome is that both invest all labor for weapons.
Following is lecture notes:
If food consumption is decided proportion of weapons( vi=yi/y1+y2*X), equilibria is y1=12=y*, because of symmetricity????
The contents of the class were three: multi-stage games and subgame perfection, Bayesian Equilibrium, and Anarchy economy.
Multi-stage games:
The games are where players act in turns. In the class setting, there were two Nash equilibria. But only one of them was reasonable. This subgame perfection can be checked by backward induction.
Bayesian Equilibrium:
We often can not know each other’s payoff because we do not always know other’s payoff and non-monetary issues. But if we assume each player can assign probability distribution to other’s payoffs, we can use the concept of Nash equilibrium. This is Bayesian Equilibrium. In Bayesian Equilibrium, players choose best strategy according to (other’s payoff probability)・(its payoff).
Anarchy economy:
This is opposition concept of perfect market. There are two players. Each one has one unit of labor. They can produce food and weapons. Weapons are used to protect and acquire foods. Only food consumption is valued. Suppose “might(=power) is right”, whoever has most weapons takes all food, the equilibrium outcome is that both invest all labor for weapons.
Following is lecture notes:
If food consumption is decided proportion of weapons( vi=yi/y1+y2*X), equilibria is y1=12=y*, because of symmetricity????
Lin Lerpold, Harry Barkema, Anders Sjoman,(2008) “Hand in Hand in India”
This is a case of SSE. It describes Hand in Hand, a NGO of India mainly donated by Swedish rich, and show its history and issues for the future.
Hand in Hand is one of the successful NGOs. But as its expansion, three problems occurred. First is business model. It means how to cut the cost of operation, and how to manage its expenditure thorough donation or its earnings of its activity. Second is human resources. NGOs usually needs a lot of skill because they have to get into different environment: different culture, value, language, and motivations. It needs a lot of experience and skills even if its salary is not better than companies. The paper indicates the competition of talented people with the booming industries of India. Last is vision. NGO’s vision has no limit, because their missions are universal. However, they should limit their universal mission because of the cost. If they expands their activity infinitely, they spend up their resources because they can not earn money freely by its activities.
In my opinion, NGO’s or NPO’s activities, except for international activities, should be done by its governments. In the first place, keeping basic life of people is completely governmental role because any governments are run by tax; the money from nation for nation. I suggest NGOs and NPOs should cooperate with the government and transfer.
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