Today’s lecture was all individual presentation. I tried to look carefully for preparation of my presentation. Here are some points:
Tone: should corresponds with characters, and atmosphere. But energetic does not always mean good.
Theme: should have some connection for listener.
New info: should be included in presentation.
Standing: stably is important.
Question: should be presented first.
Picture: is better to have some caption
Character: too small is hard to see
I noticed that listeners were always feeling boring. That was big problem…
After the lecture, I asked some question about last assignment. Here are answers for the questions.
Improvement vs improving: -ing is used to express activity.
Equal to vs equal as: to is directly same, as is indirectly such as property of someone.
Stable vs reliable: stable is about quantity, and reliable is about quality.
I will make my presentation now!
Thursday 27 November 2008
Figure, Reason, Point, Before view
Today’s lecture should have been team presentations, but actually was not. This was twice that I misunderstood the obligation of presentation. But it was not bad, because I got an opportunity to improve my presentation.
Today’s lecture style was orthodox: first was summary of the case, and discussion about that. But what I could not understand was she divided class into three, not into group that prepared some presentation, and gave each group each role such as product manager, and started to discuss about the case. I thought this way was inefficient because we can not necessarily express the opinion which was made by group, and ultimately this group preparing and non-group lecture made the quality of discussion lower.
But, of course, there was some positive aspects about that. One was it made clear characters and opinions of individual students. What was more, the discussion confused in two positions; promote organic cotton, and not care about organic. The discussion was interesting because it told me how to express my opinion, and what is good speech.
From this lecture, I learned four things:
Figure: In discussion, or business communication, figure is important and only information we can rely on. For example, figure about distribution, money, time, are most important figures.
Reason: It is also important for discussion. Opinion itself is no value, and reason is true value because there is no room to inspect opinion without reason.
Point: To grasp key factor is important in the premise of figure and reason. For example, what is competitive advantage for a firm.
Before view: This is overlook of discussion. There are some question and requirement for discussion, but before that, to see broadly is more important. For example, in the case of H&M, organic cotton is used by only 1%, it means it might be waste of time to discuss organic cotton.
Today’s lecture style was orthodox: first was summary of the case, and discussion about that. But what I could not understand was she divided class into three, not into group that prepared some presentation, and gave each group each role such as product manager, and started to discuss about the case. I thought this way was inefficient because we can not necessarily express the opinion which was made by group, and ultimately this group preparing and non-group lecture made the quality of discussion lower.
But, of course, there was some positive aspects about that. One was it made clear characters and opinions of individual students. What was more, the discussion confused in two positions; promote organic cotton, and not care about organic. The discussion was interesting because it told me how to express my opinion, and what is good speech.
From this lecture, I learned four things:
Figure: In discussion, or business communication, figure is important and only information we can rely on. For example, figure about distribution, money, time, are most important figures.
Reason: It is also important for discussion. Opinion itself is no value, and reason is true value because there is no room to inspect opinion without reason.
Point: To grasp key factor is important in the premise of figure and reason. For example, what is competitive advantage for a firm.
Before view: This is overlook of discussion. There are some question and requirement for discussion, but before that, to see broadly is more important. For example, in the case of H&M, organic cotton is used by only 1%, it means it might be waste of time to discuss organic cotton.
Wednesday 26 November 2008
Globalization opposes Sustainability
Today’s sustainable management was first “lecture”. The theme of the lecture was Sustainable Supply Chain, and teacher explained this from company’s view and customer’s view.
From company:
Most impressive was the fact that globalization opposes sustainability. Globalization necessarily increases transportation, and distance between customer and production of goods. It means more consumption of fuels, concealment of negative information such as child labor or environmental destruction. And ultimately, the goal of the sustainable supply chain is to reduce resources; opposite to marketing.
From customer:
Sustainable Supply Chain means changes of lifestyle for customer. But it also opposition of economy; large consumptions and large productions for growth.
About presentation:
From her presentation, I leaned followings;
Common knowledge is waste of time
Slide should be formatted for efficient information
Credibility is important for attention
Sustainability is naturally boring area for students, because we do not know contradiction to environment in business situation; the core of this area.
Remko I. van Hoek(1999),”From reversed logistics to green supply chains”
This is a study to aiming at making framework of green supply chain to meet ecological foot print’s requirement. This paper demonstrates key points and challenges of research of green supply chain management, and possibility for them in real world.(reverse means recycle)
In this paper, author organizes concepts of reverse logistics, green supply chain, and the change from former to latter. The biggest difference between two is range of players. Logistics means only firms activity, but supply chain contains streams of product, raw supplier to customers, nearly whole society. What is more, globalization make supply chain more broad and complex. To overcome this, this paper suggests firms should not only reverse but also act value-seeking approach, to add some value for products, for resource reduction; ultimate goal.
Esben Rahbek Pedersen and Peter Neergaard(2006)"Caveat Emptor-Let the Buyer Beware! Environmental Labelling and the Limitations of “Green” Consumerism
This is a study for inspecting Green labeling. In 1990s, a great many number of environmental rebelling products were released, and some of them received a great deal of attention while others remain in obscurity. To understand the difference, this paper discusses factors that determine market impact. The conclusion of the paper is that, the differences are caused by over-simplified concept of “green” consumer, and this leads firms fail to capture the actual complexity of consumer value, attitudes of behavior.
Tuesday 25 November 2008
gramatical problem
Today's class consisted of DCS and excercises of gramatical mistake in English writing.
followings are some points:
DCS:
*Voice is important(do not read, but tell)
*hand is also important
*familiarity(closeness to topic for listener)
*small paper is good
*last is "thank you for listening"
Excercise:
divide sentences(use some connecting, and find each subject)
*, and or .(full stop)
*Having +++ed,
*since is because + time
make formal:
*other guys>competitors
*are dying>be looking forward to
*great>rewarding
*flop>not beeing successful
*crazy about>very enthusiastic about
find less word:
a check in the amount of $10> a check for $10
along the lines of> like
in reference to > about
in regard to > about
viable to the eye > visible
will you be so kind as to > please
followings are some points:
DCS:
*Voice is important(do not read, but tell)
*hand is also important
*familiarity(closeness to topic for listener)
*small paper is good
*last is "thank you for listening"
Excercise:
divide sentences(use some connecting, and find each subject)
*, and or .(full stop)
*Having +++ed,
*since is because + time
make formal:
*other guys>competitors
*are dying>be looking forward to
*great>rewarding
*flop>not beeing successful
*crazy about>very enthusiastic about
find less word:
a check in the amount of $10> a check for $10
along the lines of> like
in reference to > about
in regard to > about
viable to the eye > visible
will you be so kind as to > please
translation feedback
done>>>fullfill
allow>>>to ++
equal as (not to)
future>>> in the future
nation>>>if it means soil, we should use land
mixture>>>combination
characteristic>>s
increment>>>enhancement
Rural area>>country side
promote>>>support
maintenance is uncountable
allow>>>to ++
equal as (not to)
future>>> in the future
nation>>>if it means soil, we should use land
mixture>>>combination
characteristic>>s
increment>>>enhancement
Rural area>>country side
promote>>>support
maintenance is uncountable
Saturday 22 November 2008
Ernst Fehr and Simon Gachter(2000)”Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity”
The aim of the paper is to explain reciprocity, a situation in which two people, groups, or countries give each other similar kinds of help or special rights. Fundamentally, economics expects selfish individuals and they can reach efficient situation in the long run. However, the authors think individuals differently; fairness, and reciprocity, and explain real situation through experiments in laboratories.
The view of reward is more effective than punishment even if it is same in economics is interesting. And the facts that fairness or incomplete constrain is preferable than selfish and complete are also interesting. But I think they can be explain profit maximization in the long term. The result of the paper is interesting for importance of system, but not so interesting for another aspect of human preference, I think.
Rolf Wustenhagen and Jasper Boehnke(2006),"Business models for sustainable energy”
“sustainable energy technologies” can be defined as providing energy services with lowe environmental impact than today, while maintaining economic efficiency and being socially acceptable. This paper is a chapter of a book and it focuses on the sustainable production perspective of this broader picture, by looking at business models for sustainable energy. It starts to describe energy industry, and next overlooks history of researches of business model, and presents appropriate model for sustainable energy technology.
According to the paper, sustainable energy technology is characterized by three factors: environmental externality, capital intensity and long lead times, and the power of incumbents. On the other hand, core concepts of business model are value production(=what is value), configuration of value creation(=how to deliver the value), and revenue model(=how to make money). These factors correspond with each other.
Author says, about value production is customer value. About configuration of value creation, outsourcing is important. And after sales service is contribute to revenue model.
Friday 21 November 2008
Rolf Wustenhagen(2004)”Sustainability and Competitiveness in the Renewable Energy Sector”
This is a case study of a Danish wind turbine manufacturing company, Vestas. Between 1994 and 2001, Vesta’s sales have increased more than tenfold. This paper examines the key success factor of Vestas, and describes its challenges for future.
The key success factors of Vestas are five.
1.A clear vision for Vestas and the industry; focus on renewable energy
2.Managing internal growth; use government, stock option, school
3.International expansion
4.The politics of wind energy; because energy is regulated industry
5.Social responsibility and environmental management; ISO14001, some certification
However, Vestas faces some challenges for example, U.S. overcapacity of energy, high utilities’ credit rate which prevent to develop projects, change of exchange rate, doubt of core-competence of vertical integration. Theoretically, wind energy is most efficient in other renewable energies and its needs will become increase to meet Kyoto protocol by 2012, but it is not clear how to solve these questions.
John Wiley and Sons, 2006,”Current Issues in the Greening of Industry”
This is a guide for business schools to study environmental case. Today, environmental problem is always discussed in everywhere in the world. But only business school, the heat is low.
For the reason of business school’s neglect of environmental energy issue, this paper presents two reasons. First is business school missed the trends because of big change of one industry different from their traditional way of study of routine whole industry. Second is its interdisciplinarity, which means complexity.
However, actually, the issue of greening industry is appropriate topic for business schools. In the future, it will be more study from the schools.
World Energy Outlook 2008, International Energy Agency
This is a report of IEA about global energy supply and demand in future. It was presented in the face of financial crisis and incremental price of energy in 2007-2008.
The report says, the current energy system is at a crossroads. The risk is lack of investment rather than resources. Urgent action is necessary but key is governmental action to make financial incentive for efficient and low carbon energy and reduction of subsidy of energy consumption.
About future demand and supply, demand will increase 45% from 2006 to 2030. in the supply, fossil fuels account for 80% of energy mix but the share will decrease compared with increase of coal and renewable resource. In the consumption, China and India account just over half of the increase in world primary energy demand.
About investment, over half of investment is for maintaining current level of supply because most of infrastructure is needed to replace by 2030. Most incremental oil will come from OPEC but appropriate investment is necessary.
Surprisingly, oil reserve is enough for 40 years, but the resources are concentrated in small region. And gas is Russia, Iran and Middle East is 56% of the world.
However, decline in oil production is accelerating field-by-field. To combat the decline and offset falling production, large investment must be done. In this process, partnerships between MNCs and national companies are important.
On the other hand, Oil-rich countries have a lot of poverty. If they spend 0.4% of oil and gas revenue for minimal energy service, they can access enough energy.
Most difficult problem is to deal with climate change. In the reference scenario, world average temperature increase to 6c in the end of the century. Three-quarters of projected increase in energy related CO2 emissions in reference scenario arises in China, India and Middle East. Only Europe and Japan are emissions in 2030 lower than today.
To overcome this situation, any strong action must be done.
Emma Sjostrom(2008)”H&M and Organic Cotton”
This is a Case about H&M, Hennes and Mauritz, one of the most famous Swedish companies. In this case, author focuses the challenge of introducing organic cotton products of H&M, such as lead time, marketing, and purchaicing.
H&M’s business concept is “to offer fashions and quality at the best price”. It originated from women’s clothes shop “Hennes”(means “hers”)in 1947, and acquired “Mauritz Widforss” in 1968. It expanded 29 countries through overcoming scandals.
About organic cotton, it started in the 1990s, but it failed because it did not live up to its fashion standard. But in 2004, it was ready to new try with new designer, Stella McCartney. And this attempt succeeded.
To achieve this, H&M had to change many things. For example, manager’s motivation for organic production, certified system, efficient logistics, and so on. It was done by commitments of each department because H&M adapts like SBU system.
For future, CEO thinking three things: long-term line of organic, promotion of organic purchase, and minimizing transportation.
long-term line of organic:
partnership of other organization for changing production sustainably
promotion of organic purchase:
use sustainable activity for advertisement
minimizing transportation:
make or use network other organic production organization
Thursday 20 November 2008
Information does not mean informative, and evaluation is made by audience not by presenter.
Today’s lecture was “Longer Individual Presentation”. I looked forward about that because it was informative for the preparation of my presentation.
Important points;
1. If there is some relation, a topic is interesting
2. an agenda is necessary if contents are complex
3. balance of atmosphere(self image) and topic is important
Daniel;
It has clear structure and simple topic. It was many information, but I could not notice that. And costume is also good.
Niklas;
One slide was good.
Yoshi;
There is too much information in one presentation.
I thought, information does not mean informative, and evaluation is made by audience not by presenter.
Important points;
1. If there is some relation, a topic is interesting
2. an agenda is necessary if contents are complex
3. balance of atmosphere(self image) and topic is important
Daniel;
It has clear structure and simple topic. It was many information, but I could not notice that. And costume is also good.
Niklas;
One slide was good.
Yoshi;
There is too much information in one presentation.
I thought, information does not mean informative, and evaluation is made by audience not by presenter.
Microfinance and study
Today's lecture was guest lecture, Lin Lerpold, Assistant Professor of SSE. She has many experiences both in business and academic. However, I felt her lecture was less interesting than I thought.
The lecture was well organized because we did many things, understanding a basic mechanism of Microfinance, describing challenges of Hand in Hand, and group work and presentation. In the introduction, she talked about five points of microfinance:
1. Peer Selection; lending to group
2. Peer Monitoring; monitor through the group
3. Dynamic incentive; start small lend, and it becomes bigger if repayment is satisfied.
4. Regular Repayment Schedule; repayment is done regularly immediately after lending
5. Collateral Substitute; there is no collateral, but have immediate fund that is 0.5% of loan as the substitute of collateral.
Next, we discussed about a case of Hand in Hand. There were too many activities that Hand in Hand was taking. Her explanation was this was typical type of NGOs because if they want to expand Microfinance, social infrastructure is needed such as school, citizen center, environment, and health and medical care. It was quite interesting point, and for me, it was also interesting to discuss more about confliction of vision and efficiency.
After that, we divided into five groups and did role play taking a role in a group. It was so excited because one of students were from India and had experience to work in a NGO. He said collecting donation is easy and hiring people also easy. But finding right people is difficult and sometimes there are scandals for NGO, such as farmer’s suicides.
About presentation of each group, there was nothing special. Of course, every presentation was clever and each has good information, but it is not real, meaningless to discuss a lot. I think this was the reason why the Indian student seemed to feel boring in the lecture. By the way, English fluentness was much important I felt…
The lecture was well organized because we did many things, understanding a basic mechanism of Microfinance, describing challenges of Hand in Hand, and group work and presentation. In the introduction, she talked about five points of microfinance:
1. Peer Selection; lending to group
2. Peer Monitoring; monitor through the group
3. Dynamic incentive; start small lend, and it becomes bigger if repayment is satisfied.
4. Regular Repayment Schedule; repayment is done regularly immediately after lending
5. Collateral Substitute; there is no collateral, but have immediate fund that is 0.5% of loan as the substitute of collateral.
Next, we discussed about a case of Hand in Hand. There were too many activities that Hand in Hand was taking. Her explanation was this was typical type of NGOs because if they want to expand Microfinance, social infrastructure is needed such as school, citizen center, environment, and health and medical care. It was quite interesting point, and for me, it was also interesting to discuss more about confliction of vision and efficiency.
After that, we divided into five groups and did role play taking a role in a group. It was so excited because one of students were from India and had experience to work in a NGO. He said collecting donation is easy and hiring people also easy. But finding right people is difficult and sometimes there are scandals for NGO, such as farmer’s suicides.
About presentation of each group, there was nothing special. Of course, every presentation was clever and each has good information, but it is not real, meaningless to discuss a lot. I think this was the reason why the Indian student seemed to feel boring in the lecture. By the way, English fluentness was much important I felt…
Wednesday 19 November 2008
Inside of Coase Theorem
(ii)(if exclusion is possible)
utility of leaving club become zero. Thus, one can sustain the optimal club size.
(iii)(if exclusion is not be credible, but menbers can adjust number of menbers)
if optimal size is not reached, menbers can offer marginal benefit of additional person for outsider.
If one joins at time zero, one can gain
(marginal benefit of optimal size) - pay
If one joins at time one, one can gain
(offer for additional person)
Therefore, encompassing club (n menbers) is sustainable if and only if
(marginal benefit of optimal size)-pay> (offer for additional person)
Summary:
if exclusion is impossible, club is break because free-riding is inevitable.
if exclusion is possible, free-riding is prevented, but optimazation depends on barganing ability of club.
Discussion:
Coase Theorem: if there are no transaction cost and property right, efficiency is reached voluntary.
This is almost true, because barganing power affects negotiation.
(but ongoing work suggest Coase Theorem holds in the end)
(i)limits of punishment and (ii)asymmetric information
is inefficiency that Coase Theorem hides.
utility of leaving club become zero. Thus, one can sustain the optimal club size.
(iii)(if exclusion is not be credible, but menbers can adjust number of menbers)
if optimal size is not reached, menbers can offer marginal benefit of additional person for outsider.
If one joins at time zero, one can gain
(marginal benefit of optimal size) - pay
If one joins at time one, one can gain
(offer for additional person)
Therefore, encompassing club (n menbers) is sustainable if and only if
(marginal benefit of optimal size)-pay> (offer for additional person)
Summary:
if exclusion is impossible, club is break because free-riding is inevitable.
if exclusion is possible, free-riding is prevented, but optimazation depends on barganing ability of club.
Discussion:
Coase Theorem: if there are no transaction cost and property right, efficiency is reached voluntary.
This is almost true, because barganing power affects negotiation.
(but ongoing work suggest Coase Theorem holds in the end)
(i)limits of punishment and (ii)asymmetric information
is inefficiency that Coase Theorem hides.
seminar2
Economics of Organization Seminar 2
Today was a seminar. I found it was easy but actually, not so easy.
But it is so interesting!!!
(a)
Owner Invests if
－1－r+δ/1－δ＞－1
ｒ＜δ/1－δ＝－１＋１/1－δ＜２
And customer knows it. Therefore, the assumption is reasonable.
(b)
owner
she chooses not invest because r>p>2.
It can be said there is no open shop.
(c)
f=fee for a gun-man
owner's incentive constraint
(1-f)(1+δ+δ2+...)>0
(this is when f>1)
a gum-man's incentive constraint
-rg+nf(1+δ+δ2+...)>0
n>rg(1-δ)/δf
(d)
c means customer has additional cost (c)for rob.
custmer's constraint changes;
1+δ/1-δ>3-p+δ/1-δ-c
p>2-c
(if p>2-c, customer pays)
It means sometimes r become more than p( if r>2 and p+c>2, r=p+2 r-2=p r>p means punishment cost is larger than punishment itself)
This means sometimes shop owner punishes by himself. But gum-man may create threat to keep their business.
(e)(f)
Quite interesting!!!
(i)short-run thinking where no investment is sustainable
one game, sometimes chicken or prisoner dilemma.
(ii)long-run thinking where investment is occur if δ is sufficiently large
Communication is important. Reputation, gossip credibility are affect efficiency.
(iii)the idea of costly punishment
If there are punishment, negotiation become efficient. Society became bigger and bigger but sometimes efficiency is not reached because punishment is costly and waste and it also has a limit.
(iv)the idea of third-party punishment
Former situation causes professional enforcer and it contribute efficient negotiation. But it enforcer sometimes creates threat by himself because if there is no threat he goes out of business. It makes inefficient situations.
(v)the idea of democratic control over punishment
Democratic society provide police. It does not have incentive to create threat because their salary is decided other way, from tax. It makes most efficient society among five.
2.
(a)
If p1 commits s1, s2' maximum share is 1-s1. In this case, p2 commits 1-s1 as s2.
reverse is the same and this means it is Nash Equilibrium.
(b)
If p1 commits s1, s2' maximum share is 1-s1. In this case, p2 commits 1-s1 or flexible
But if p2 commit flexible at first, s1 commit 1 . This is not synmetrical.
It means it is not Nash equilibrium.
(c)
(i)
If p1 commits s1, s2' maximum share is 1-s1-c.
In this case, p2 commit flexible because 1-s1>1-s1-c.
But If p2 commit flexible at first, s1 commits 1. It means previous equilibrium can be reached no longer.
(ii)
If p1 commits 1 first, p2 commits flexible because there is no room.
If p2 commits flexible p1 commits 1. Its synmetrical, and Nash equilibria.
and vice versa because of the synmetrical condition.
(d)
(i)
(If c>0, s1+s2=1 is impossible)
Nash equilibriums are S1=S2=1, and B1=B2=1/2.
Player1:
Expected payoff of S1: c=commit, f=fail to commit, w=wait, (but there is no choice of p2=w because c>0)
(p1,p2)=(c,f)+(f,c)+(f,f)=q(1-q)1+(q-1)q+(1-q)(1-q)*b1-c
if p1 choose w, expected payoff is
(p1,p2)=q0+(1-q)b1
if p1 commits s1 and it works(with q), equilibria can be reached when p2 choose flexible or fail to commit(1-q).
(ii)
Probability of disagreement is qq, therefore, agreement is given by 1-qq.
(iii)
No. why is it?
(e)
Features which fits the disagreement;
・zero sum game(whole amount of teritory is fixed)
・2 players, commitment is done at the same time.
・commitment stick(because of political power???)
features not be captured by the model;
・third palty's infulence(U.N.,U.S,)(it is impossibe to
・repeated game(not finshed in only once)
・If s1+s2>1, benefit is not lose. Negotiation repeats.
Today was a seminar. I found it was easy but actually, not so easy.
But it is so interesting!!!
(a)
Owner Invests if
－1－r+δ/1－δ＞－1
ｒ＜δ/1－δ＝－１＋１/1－δ＜２
And customer knows it. Therefore, the assumption is reasonable.
(b)
owner
she chooses not invest because r>p>2.
It can be said there is no open shop.
(c)
f=fee for a gun-man
owner's incentive constraint
(1-f)(1+δ+δ2+...)>0
(this is when f>1)
a gum-man's incentive constraint
-rg+nf(1+δ+δ2+...)>0
n>rg(1-δ)/δf
(d)
c means customer has additional cost (c)for rob.
custmer's constraint changes;
1+δ/1-δ>3-p+δ/1-δ-c
p>2-c
(if p>2-c, customer pays)
It means sometimes r become more than p( if r>2 and p+c>2, r=p+2 r-2=p r>p means punishment cost is larger than punishment itself)
This means sometimes shop owner punishes by himself. But gum-man may create threat to keep their business.
(e)(f)
Quite interesting!!!
(i)short-run thinking where no investment is sustainable
one game, sometimes chicken or prisoner dilemma.
(ii)long-run thinking where investment is occur if δ is sufficiently large
Communication is important. Reputation, gossip credibility are affect efficiency.
(iii)the idea of costly punishment
If there are punishment, negotiation become efficient. Society became bigger and bigger but sometimes efficiency is not reached because punishment is costly and waste and it also has a limit.
(iv)the idea of third-party punishment
Former situation causes professional enforcer and it contribute efficient negotiation. But it enforcer sometimes creates threat by himself because if there is no threat he goes out of business. It makes inefficient situations.
(v)the idea of democratic control over punishment
Democratic society provide police. It does not have incentive to create threat because their salary is decided other way, from tax. It makes most efficient society among five.
2.
(a)
If p1 commits s1, s2' maximum share is 1-s1. In this case, p2 commits 1-s1 as s2.
reverse is the same and this means it is Nash Equilibrium.
(b)
If p1 commits s1, s2' maximum share is 1-s1. In this case, p2 commits 1-s1 or flexible
But if p2 commit flexible at first, s1 commit 1 . This is not synmetrical.
It means it is not Nash equilibrium.
(c)
(i)
If p1 commits s1, s2' maximum share is 1-s1-c.
In this case, p2 commit flexible because 1-s1>1-s1-c.
But If p2 commit flexible at first, s1 commits 1. It means previous equilibrium can be reached no longer.
(ii)
If p1 commits 1 first, p2 commits flexible because there is no room.
If p2 commits flexible p1 commits 1. Its synmetrical, and Nash equilibria.
and vice versa because of the synmetrical condition.
(d)
(i)
(If c>0, s1+s2=1 is impossible)
Nash equilibriums are S1=S2=1, and B1=B2=1/2.
Player1:
Expected payoff of S1: c=commit, f=fail to commit, w=wait, (but there is no choice of p2=w because c>0)
(p1,p2)=(c,f)+(f,c)+(f,f)=q(1-q)1+(q-1)q+(1-q)(1-q)*b1-c
if p1 choose w, expected payoff is
(p1,p2)=q0+(1-q)b1
if p1 commits s1 and it works(with q), equilibria can be reached when p2 choose flexible or fail to commit(1-q).
(ii)
Probability of disagreement is qq, therefore, agreement is given by 1-qq.
(iii)
No. why is it?
(e)
Features which fits the disagreement;
・zero sum game(whole amount of teritory is fixed)
・2 players, commitment is done at the same time.
・commitment stick(because of political power???)
features not be captured by the model;
・third palty's infulence(U.N.,U.S,)(it is impossibe to
・repeated game(not finshed in only once)
・If s1+s2>1, benefit is not lose. Negotiation repeats.
Tuesday 18 November 2008
Limited Punishment
It was one lecture absence from last leacture I attended. Today's topic was limited punishment; in real sociaty, it is difficult to punish appropriately because of social system and cost. To achieve efficiency, some rewards should be used otherwise problem of commitment will rise.
This model's implication is useful for relation worker and employ, and entrepreneur and investor. And it also can be applied in justification of controling, defferences of credible system between developed and developing countries, needs of education for alter signaling of money.
Limited Punishment:
Commitment problem can be avoided if “cheating” is punished strongly enough. However, nowadays there are limits to both physical and economic punishments.
Which limit? ;death penalty, economic penalty.
Why are there such limits?; cost(because it is difficult to measure degree of punishment according to each crime. Difference of preference(because value of money or time is different among people, it is impossible to set appropriate punishment. Law(because law should be made before crime is made)
Therefore, in order to deter cheating, there must be a reward for good behavior. Sometimes, the required reward is so large that the parties have to live with the commitment problem.
Example 1:Efficiency Wages
Player: a employer and a worker.
B(e)=outcome of the work
C(e)=cost of the work
W(e)=wage
e=｛eh,eh｝
L=limit of wage
A Employer maximize B(e)-W(e), and a worker maximize W(e)-C(e).
If L is large enough and C(el) is low enough, the worker has no incentive to work with eh, because if she work with el, she can get at least L. It means inefficiency is caused by limitation of wages, and it is impossible to reach efficient equilibria.
To generalize the case, we can assume
B(eh)-C(eh)>B(el)-C(el)>0 (=eh is better than el)
Consider the contract:
W(el)=L, W(eh)=C(eh)
This contract induces effort eh if
W(eh)-C(eh)>W(el)-C(el), sufficient condition is C(el)>L (L is useless)
Interpretation: the contract will always be signed, and effort will always be efficient.
General Analysis of Limited Liability Case;
Suppose now that L>C(el). Then, the above contract does not work. The cheapest way to induce high effort is to set w(el)=L (as before) and set w(eh) to solve. (this means minimum wage is indifferent from w(el) because L is same as w(el))
W(eh)-C(eh)=L-C(el),
: eh and el gave same incentive for a worker.
That is
W(eh)=L+C(eh)-C(el)
:this is cheapest way to reach efficient equilibria.
Incentive wage should be consist of limit wage and difference of cost between motivated and not.
Example2:Corporate Finance
Player :an entrepreneur, an investor
I=investment cost
A=equity
R=gross investment return
b=private benefit to entrepreneur
p=probability of success
w=entrepreneur’s compensation in case of success
Assumptions;
If the entrepreneur works, p=h and b=0.
If the entrepreneur shirk, p=l and b=B>0.
Working good for welfare (h-l)R>B (=hR>B+lR
(work is better than shirk for the worker)
Shirking never supportable: lR-I+B<0(= net revenue of shrink is less than –B)
(shrink is not supportable if net return of shrinking case is more minus than private benefit of entrepreneur.)
Analysis;
Social optimum: Invest iff hR-I>0
Entrepreneur works iff(h-l)w>B(= hw>B+lw)
Rp=R-W=R-B/(h-l); expected return is net return minus wage for entrepreneur.
hRp>I-A; expected high revenue is more than investment cost minus asset of an entrepreneur.
Insight;
B=reputation of an entrepreneur, A=asset of an entrepreneur. It says good reputation and large asset is important for investment.
Investors control:
Monitoring cost (but it is non-monetary)is γ and it increase output by τ, there is funding if
hRp+τ＞I-A
If hRp0 ( it means hw is more than monitoring cost ofγ)
Implications:
Investor control may be justified when entrepreneur has little equity, and when investor control will not impose an excessive burden on the entrepreneur.
(because τ makes it easier to invest ifγ is not so heavy for entrepreneur)
Poor entrepreneur with large funding needs retain few control rights.(no money means no right)
In countries with weak legal enforcement of creditors’ claims, there is scope for other enforcement mechanisms. (development countries has many private finance)
Wealthy entrepreneurs relinquish few control rights( prefer to raise funds through bonds and bank loans with weak covenants)
Broader implications;
Imperfect credit markets imply poor people’s talent.(If someone is poor, she cannot get investment even if she has good talent)
The choice between production and crime is affected by the worker’s labor market prospects( low-skilled worker tends to commit a crime)
Absent sufficient punishment, even selfish rich people may favor some redistribution in order to prevent crime.(if punishment is not enough, not only worker but also employer (usually richer than worker) needs redistribution to prevent crime or shrink.
Words:
Argument; a set of reasons that show that something is true or not. The act of disagreeing of questioning something
This model's implication is useful for relation worker and employ, and entrepreneur and investor. And it also can be applied in justification of controling, defferences of credible system between developed and developing countries, needs of education for alter signaling of money.
Limited Punishment:
Commitment problem can be avoided if “cheating” is punished strongly enough. However, nowadays there are limits to both physical and economic punishments.
Which limit? ;death penalty, economic penalty.
Why are there such limits?; cost(because it is difficult to measure degree of punishment according to each crime. Difference of preference(because value of money or time is different among people, it is impossible to set appropriate punishment. Law(because law should be made before crime is made)
Therefore, in order to deter cheating, there must be a reward for good behavior. Sometimes, the required reward is so large that the parties have to live with the commitment problem.
Example 1:Efficiency Wages
Player: a employer and a worker.
B(e)=outcome of the work
C(e)=cost of the work
W(e)=wage
e=｛eh,eh｝
L=limit of wage
A Employer maximize B(e)-W(e), and a worker maximize W(e)-C(e).
If L is large enough and C(el) is low enough, the worker has no incentive to work with eh, because if she work with el, she can get at least L. It means inefficiency is caused by limitation of wages, and it is impossible to reach efficient equilibria.
To generalize the case, we can assume
B(eh)-C(eh)>B(el)-C(el)>0 (=eh is better than el)
Consider the contract:
W(el)=L, W(eh)=C(eh)
This contract induces effort eh if
W(eh)-C(eh)>W(el)-C(el), sufficient condition is C(el)>L (L is useless)
Interpretation: the contract will always be signed, and effort will always be efficient.
General Analysis of Limited Liability Case;
Suppose now that L>C(el). Then, the above contract does not work. The cheapest way to induce high effort is to set w(el)=L (as before) and set w(eh) to solve. (this means minimum wage is indifferent from w(el) because L is same as w(el))
W(eh)-C(eh)=L-C(el),
: eh and el gave same incentive for a worker.
That is
W(eh)=L+C(eh)-C(el)
:this is cheapest way to reach efficient equilibria.
Incentive wage should be consist of limit wage and difference of cost between motivated and not.
Example2:Corporate Finance
Player :an entrepreneur, an investor
I=investment cost
A=equity
R=gross investment return
b=private benefit to entrepreneur
p=probability of success
w=entrepreneur’s compensation in case of success
Assumptions;
If the entrepreneur works, p=h and b=0.
If the entrepreneur shirk, p=l and b=B>0.
Working good for welfare (h-l)R>B (=hR>B+lR
(work is better than shirk for the worker)
Shirking never supportable: lR-I+B<0(= net revenue of shrink is less than –B)
(shrink is not supportable if net return of shrinking case is more minus than private benefit of entrepreneur.)
Analysis;
Social optimum: Invest iff hR-I>0
Entrepreneur works iff(h-l)w>B(= hw>B+lw)
Rp=R-W=R-B/(h-l); expected return is net return minus wage for entrepreneur.
hRp>I-A; expected high revenue is more than investment cost minus asset of an entrepreneur.
Insight;
B=reputation of an entrepreneur, A=asset of an entrepreneur. It says good reputation and large asset is important for investment.
Investors control:
Monitoring cost (but it is non-monetary)is γ and it increase output by τ, there is funding if
hRp+τ＞I-A
If hRp
Implications:
Investor control may be justified when entrepreneur has little equity, and when investor control will not impose an excessive burden on the entrepreneur.
(because τ makes it easier to invest ifγ is not so heavy for entrepreneur)
Poor entrepreneur with large funding needs retain few control rights.(no money means no right)
In countries with weak legal enforcement of creditors’ claims, there is scope for other enforcement mechanisms. (development countries has many private finance)
Wealthy entrepreneurs relinquish few control rights( prefer to raise funds through bonds and bank loans with weak covenants)
Broader implications;
Imperfect credit markets imply poor people’s talent.(If someone is poor, she cannot get investment even if she has good talent)
The choice between production and crime is affected by the worker’s labor market prospects( low-skilled worker tends to commit a crime)
Absent sufficient punishment, even selfish rich people may favor some redistribution in order to prevent crime.(if punishment is not enough, not only worker but also employer (usually richer than worker) needs redistribution to prevent crime or shrink.
Words:
Argument; a set of reasons that show that something is true or not. The act of disagreeing of questioning something
Sunday 16 November 2008
Jonathan Morduch(1999)”The Microfinance Promise”
This is a verification of Microfinance. Microfinance is booming but there is not empirical study about its efficiency, there is only a promise. And some Microfinance institutions reject subsidies because government failed the same work as Microfinance.
In the paper, author concludes the effect of Microfinance is limited, and their operations are cost-sensitive because they have to lend small money for large number of people. To improve the cost structure, they have to change management structure or get subsidies. Subsidies are totally beneficial for Microfinance institutions even if it has bad effect. If the cost problem is cleared, they can focus more poor people because they now lend money less poor group of people than they want.
However, “making a real dent in poverty rates will require increasing overall levels of economic growth and employment generation”. Microfinance may be help some part of poverty reduction, but it is only introduction. In future, organizations of Microfinance have to challenge for innovation of new model.
Saturday 15 November 2008
Thomas C. Schelling(1956),"An Essay on Bargaining”
This is the oldest and the most difficult economic paper I have ever read. And First paper written by Nobel prize economist, Thomas C. Schelling, a expert of game theory.
It was hard to read because when it was written, there was no framework of game theory. In this paper, a situation of bargaining is written in a text without mathematics.
Mainly, it describes a difficulty of efficient bargaining beecause each negotiator has incentive to cheat. In other words, making credibility is impossible. To overcome the difficulty, it is useful to use share value (i.e. culture, religion), third party (=law, cort), separated stage, commitment.
The reason to use separated stage is that, if a negotiation is divided into some parts, a merit from each game becomes lower, and incentive to build credibility becomes bigger because credibility is important for future games. This application can be seen in daily life; amortization, short examination in each class, and so on.
In commitment, weakness is strength. If adversary knows opponent’s constraints, he have to consider the condition because it can not be changed by anyone. It can be say in a abstract game, if one has dominant strategy, he/she get high score because its opponents premise its choice.
I spent reading it for a week… Next time, I will read two days!!!
Friday 14 November 2008
Teacher is evaluator
Today's lecture was presentation!
We had a presentation, and listened others'.
Now, I am so interested in methods of presentation because I will have one in Business English class.
From today's class, I learned following:
1.voice
most important thing is voice. Clearer and Stronger is better.
fluents are also important.
2.hand
Second is hand actions. It make explanation clearer.
Most impressive thing was confidence.
They did not need any help from teacher, they demonstrated "We want to <>, and we will do by <>". For me, teacher is person who gives answers and help. But for them, teacher is audience to evaluate them. To get high grade, they appeal their skill and talent even if actually not so. It is completely different for me.
The contents itself were not so advanced, I thought. But presentation and English were really good.
What the teacher pointed was "Narrower is better". She wanted us to focus business analysis for sustainability. Everyone felt that in class, because she will evaluate us.
We had a presentation, and listened others'.
Now, I am so interested in methods of presentation because I will have one in Business English class.
From today's class, I learned following:
1.voice
most important thing is voice. Clearer and Stronger is better.
fluents are also important.
2.hand
Second is hand actions. It make explanation clearer.
Most impressive thing was confidence.
They did not need any help from teacher, they demonstrated "We want to <>, and we will do by <>". For me, teacher is person who gives answers and help. But for them, teacher is audience to evaluate them. To get high grade, they appeal their skill and talent even if actually not so. It is completely different for me.
The contents itself were not so advanced, I thought. But presentation and English were really good.
What the teacher pointed was "Narrower is better". She wanted us to focus business analysis for sustainability. Everyone felt that in class, because she will evaluate us.
Bargaining and Efficiency
Today's lecture was taken by the professor after an interval of a week. The lecture started from the rest of last lecture.
Rest of the last lecture:
This was the case of professional enforcement in a game which there are several shops and customers. Setting r=imidiate punishment cost, δ=discounter, punishment enforcer is easier to sustain in a price equal to marginal cost. It can be say natural monopoly because it is only price competition and if a enforcer enter and down the price, shops go it, and finally, two enforcers share a market in the same price.
These game describes we can reach efficient equilibria by changing our view, not changing situation and resource.
After that, we proceeded new topics:Strategic Bargaining
Strategic Bargaining:
Suppose each player can choose between (i)going directly to the negotiation table and (ii)trying to grab surplus(commit how much he/she want, and if it is possible, he/she can get it). Previously, we assumed efficient and fair negotiation. But this time, we assumed strategic negotiation.
Strategic Grabbing:
Before a game, each player can choose
Suppose each player can choose between (i)going directly to the negotiation table and (ii)trying to grab surplus, and this situation also can be described as game. Sometime, we can see "prisoner's dilemma" or "chiken"(there are two Nash Equilibria, and each choice has risk became lower)
Strategic Commitment
*mathmatical symbols
{A,B}=consists of A and B
[A,B]=consists A to B (contains A and B)
(A,B)=consists A to B (does not contain A or B)
{A}=collection of A
Old result(suppose cost of commitment(c) is zero, probability of commitment success (q) is one):
If commitments are costless and perfect, any feasible payoff can be obtained in equilibrium.(Nash,1953;Ceawford,1982)
Newresult:(suppose c>0, q=1)
With small positive commitment costs and perfect commitment, irerated elimination of strictly dominated strategies leaves only three solutions:
(i)Player 1 gets everything for sure
(ii)Player 2 gets everything for sure
(iii)conflict with large probability
idea of proof: If s<β, w is selected, then other player choose S as 1
New result 2(suppose c>0, q<1)
result 3
With small positive commitment costs and imperfect commitment, iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies implies conflict with probability q2
Idea of proof:
(a)show that w strictly dominates si<βi
(if si<βi, si-c<βi, therefore each player choose w)
(b)show that mixd strategy which plays 1 with probability si and w with probability 1-si,
now strictly dominates si<(βi,1)
(if bi
(c)1 dominate w
(each players dominate w?)
New result 3:Dynamic bargaining
This is repeated game.
Suppose that failed negotiations continue until agreement.
(i)As long as both negotiators are commited:disagreement
(ii)If both uncommited:Efficient agreement
(iii)If one committed and the other uncommited: the uncommitted negotiator deciders whether to accept proposal or make new commitment
Let c=0, and V denote expected present net value of a player, δ denote discount factor.
V=δ(qqv+q(1-q)v+(1-q)q(1-v)+(1-q)vv)
{qqv,q(1-q)v,(1-q)q(1-v),(1-q)vv}＝{(commit,commit),(commit,uncommit),(uncommit,commit),(uncommit,uncommit)}
V＝δ(1-q2)/2(1－δq2)
if q goes 1, v become 1/2.
Rest of the last lecture:
This was the case of professional enforcement in a game which there are several shops and customers. Setting r=imidiate punishment cost, δ=discounter, punishment enforcer is easier to sustain in a price equal to marginal cost. It can be say natural monopoly because it is only price competition and if a enforcer enter and down the price, shops go it, and finally, two enforcers share a market in the same price.
These game describes we can reach efficient equilibria by changing our view, not changing situation and resource.
After that, we proceeded new topics:Strategic Bargaining
Strategic Bargaining:
Suppose each player can choose between (i)going directly to the negotiation table and (ii)trying to grab surplus(commit how much he/she want, and if it is possible, he/she can get it). Previously, we assumed efficient and fair negotiation. But this time, we assumed strategic negotiation.
Strategic Grabbing:
Before a game, each player can choose
Suppose each player can choose between (i)going directly to the negotiation table and (ii)trying to grab surplus, and this situation also can be described as game. Sometime, we can see "prisoner's dilemma" or "chiken"(there are two Nash Equilibria, and each choice has risk became lower)
Strategic Commitment
*mathmatical symbols
{A,B}=consists of A and B
[A,B]=consists A to B (contains A and B)
(A,B)=consists A to B (does not contain A or B)
{A}=collection of A
Old result(suppose cost of commitment(c) is zero, probability of commitment success (q) is one):
If commitments are costless and perfect, any feasible payoff can be obtained in equilibrium.(Nash,1953;Ceawford,1982)
Newresult:(suppose c>0, q=1)
With small positive commitment costs and perfect commitment, irerated elimination of strictly dominated strategies leaves only three solutions:
(i)Player 1 gets everything for sure
(ii)Player 2 gets everything for sure
(iii)conflict with large probability
idea of proof: If s<β, w is selected, then other player choose S as 1
New result 2(suppose c>0, q<1)
result 3
With small positive commitment costs and imperfect commitment, iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies implies conflict with probability q2
Idea of proof:
(a)show that w strictly dominates si<βi
(if si<βi, si-c<βi, therefore each player choose w)
(b)show that mixd strategy which plays 1 with probability si and w with probability 1-si,
now strictly dominates si<(βi,1)
(if bi
(c)1 dominate w
(each players dominate w?)
New result 3:Dynamic bargaining
This is repeated game.
Suppose that failed negotiations continue until agreement.
(i)As long as both negotiators are commited:disagreement
(ii)If both uncommited:Efficient agreement
(iii)If one committed and the other uncommited: the uncommitted negotiator deciders whether to accept proposal or make new commitment
Let c=0, and V denote expected present net value of a player, δ denote discount factor.
V=δ(qqv+q(1-q)v+(1-q)q(1-v)+(1-q)vv)
{qqv,q(1-q)v,(1-q)q(1-v),(1-q)vv}＝{(commit,commit),(commit,uncommit),(uncommit,commit),(uncommit,uncommit)}
V＝δ(1-q2)/2(1－δq2)
if q goes 1, v become 1/2.
Thursday 13 November 2008
Dead Celebrity Surprise
Today, I have a presentation: Dead Celebrity Surprise(DCS).
It was worse than I had expected.
The reason was;
1.It was not interesting for me(lack of my energy)
2.The frow of the text was not good
3.There were not so relevant picture to contents(lack of correspondence)
4.Not so enjoyable for me
5.My English was completely bad
Sometime, I forget I am worst English speaker in the class.
But I will try to make use of my strength.
Translation:
In many case, there are lots of long sentences in the object of translation.
We should change the sentence and divide them into a few sentences. We can also change the order clause in order that is easer to read.
And sometimes, the standard is not "right", but "clear".
Followings are other points;
*person=always , who
*many=many people
*on one's behalf of= always one's is other's
*repetition=noun of repeat
The use of this/that:
It represents distance about space/time. Of course, this is closer than that. But this and that are used at the same time as parallel:
This??, and that??
this=something you like, and that=something you do not like
Presentation:
We talked about looking and contents. For me, the best harvest in the talk was "audience",reason for the presentation. Because in my longer individual presentation, the audience is fixed, and I can tell preferences of some of them. It means we have to consider in choosing topic. I have decided my theme already, but I will make some reasoning about the topic for the audience.
Feedback of email English:
After the class, I asked some questions about feedback of my assignment.
These are the points:
*the difference between "this is why" and "this is a reason why".
"this is why" is reason.
"this is a reason why" is one of reasons.
and "this is a reason that" is wrong sentence.
*stuff
stuff is a collective noun as sheep.
stuff= a group of stuff
stuffs= groups of stuff
*reach/arrive
reach needs object(reach my home)
arrive needs nothing(arrive)
Anyway, I finished one of my big work in the class.
There are one more presentation. And today's topic was about the method of translation and presentation.
It was worse than I had expected.
The reason was;
1.It was not interesting for me(lack of my energy)
2.The frow of the text was not good
3.There were not so relevant picture to contents(lack of correspondence)
4.Not so enjoyable for me
5.My English was completely bad
Sometime, I forget I am worst English speaker in the class.
But I will try to make use of my strength.
Translation:
In many case, there are lots of long sentences in the object of translation.
We should change the sentence and divide them into a few sentences. We can also change the order clause in order that is easer to read.
And sometimes, the standard is not "right", but "clear".
Followings are other points;
*person=always , who
*many=many people
*on one's behalf of= always one's is other's
*repetition=noun of repeat
The use of this/that:
It represents distance about space/time. Of course, this is closer than that. But this and that are used at the same time as parallel:
This??, and that??
this=something you like, and that=something you do not like
Presentation:
We talked about looking and contents. For me, the best harvest in the talk was "audience",reason for the presentation. Because in my longer individual presentation, the audience is fixed, and I can tell preferences of some of them. It means we have to consider in choosing topic. I have decided my theme already, but I will make some reasoning about the topic for the audience.
Feedback of email English:
After the class, I asked some questions about feedback of my assignment.
These are the points:
*the difference between "this is why" and "this is a reason why".
"this is why" is reason.
"this is a reason why" is one of reasons.
and "this is a reason that" is wrong sentence.
*stuff
stuff is a collective noun as sheep.
stuff= a group of stuff
stuffs= groups of stuff
*reach/arrive
reach needs object(reach my home)
arrive needs nothing(arrive)
Anyway, I finished one of my big work in the class.
There are one more presentation. And today's topic was about the method of translation and presentation.
Sustainable, CSR reports
Today's lecture was about accounting CSR and sustaibability. The topic was so interesting because measurement of CSR is big problem for sustaibability.
Today, a guest came from an accounting firm. She was good at speaking English and talking. She was a kind of activist, but she knew about business or economics through her job and experience of study in a unversity. It was surprising for me, and big difference between most activists in Japan, I think. Howver, I could not comprehend fully what she spoke because of my lack of ability to hear.
The structure of the lecture was simple.
1.fact(problem/solution)
-global index(macro)
-example(micro)
2.CSR
-defenition
-position in society
3.CSR report
-why report is necessary
-law(government)
-report(private)
-index
What I was supprised at was Sweden has compursoly law for reporting CSR.
It is difficult in Japan.
And I leanrd two new things:
350(ppm): That is the level to which Hansen believes we need to reduce the concentration of carbon dioxide (and by implication, other greenhouse gases) in the atmosphere if we want to avoid a series of catastrophic climate tipping points.
ANIARA:The poem of a famous Swedish writer , Harry Martinson, who was a Nobel prize writer in 1972. This is about space travel and its human struggle. the story is really interesting.
I will read someday, and also read CSR report in this week!
translation presentation
Today's class started from DSC, self presentation about three dead celebrities. And we had short presentation about each text of translation.
Concerning DSC, four people presented their parties.
It was so interesting because everyone devised the way of presentation to make fun! most impressive thing was everyone set a theme about party, and clarified it at the beginning of the presentations.
In the part of explanation of the assignment of translation, it was bad.
I prepared well, but it was not good. I think the reason was it was so long for the class, and I could not put my feeling into the reading.
Today, I have DCS, so I will try to overcome such a fault.
Concerning DSC, four people presented their parties.
It was so interesting because everyone devised the way of presentation to make fun! most impressive thing was everyone set a theme about party, and clarified it at the beginning of the presentations.
In the part of explanation of the assignment of translation, it was bad.
I prepared well, but it was not good. I think the reason was it was so long for the class, and I could not put my feeling into the reading.
Today, I have DCS, so I will try to overcome such a fault.
email feedback!
I received e-mail assignment feedback.
The point was not bad, but grade was "G".
What happend? I will ask teacher.
What I have learned was follwings:
*"have" can not be used with "yesterday"
*trouble is uncountable
* and/so is used succession of time
*"go" is need with preposition(from, in, to, on)
*if it is a trip, road should be trip.
*This was why /reason
*consider does not need prepositions
*one of **s? staff is singular?
*invoice "for"
*not plane, but flight(if it is a service)
*compensate "for"
*plane road>>flight
*ticket "for"
*next needs "the"
*confirm needs no preposition
*trouble "with"
The point was not bad, but grade was "G".
What happend? I will ask teacher.
What I have learned was follwings:
*"have" can not be used with "yesterday"
*trouble is uncountable
* and/so is used succession of time
*"go" is need with preposition(from, in, to, on)
*if it is a trip, road should be trip.
*This was why /reason
*consider does not need prepositions
*one of **s? staff is singular?
*invoice "for"
*not plane, but flight(if it is a service)
*compensate "for"
*plane road>>flight
*ticket "for"
*next needs "the"
*confirm needs no preposition
*trouble "with"
Monday 10 November 2008
Seminar1
Today’s class was different class from ordinal one. It was just explanation of the seminar of the class. This was why the teacher was different. But her English was quite good.
The points of the seminar for me were following:
1. Talk does not mean credibility
If two players talk before the game, it does not always mean they can reach efficient equilibria. If there is one Nash equilibria, they can reach the equilibria. But if there are two equilibrias, it does not always reach the most efficient one. This is because payoff and credibility are different thing.
2. In stage game, we have to guess about the relation between them
If the game has several stages, there are some relations between them. We have to guess about it even if it is not mentioned. It becomes possible to make integrated game table.
By the lecture, I learned I had missed a lot of things about glossary of game theory. These are following:
Bayesian game:
The game the information is incomplete, but each player knows probability of opponent’s behavior.
Bayesian Nash equilibria:
The equilibria that maximize each player’s expected value.
Perfect Bayesian equilibria(PBE):
Subgame perfect Nash equilibria(Subgame perfect equilibria) in incomplete information
Mixed strategy equilibria:
The correction of probabilities of strategies.
Subgame perfect Nash equilibria(Subgame perfect equilibria):
The definition in dynamic games and it represents a Nash equilibrium of every subgame of the original game.
The points of the seminar for me were following:
1. Talk does not mean credibility
If two players talk before the game, it does not always mean they can reach efficient equilibria. If there is one Nash equilibria, they can reach the equilibria. But if there are two equilibrias, it does not always reach the most efficient one. This is because payoff and credibility are different thing.
2. In stage game, we have to guess about the relation between them
If the game has several stages, there are some relations between them. We have to guess about it even if it is not mentioned. It becomes possible to make integrated game table.
By the lecture, I learned I had missed a lot of things about glossary of game theory. These are following:
Bayesian game:
The game the information is incomplete, but each player knows probability of opponent’s behavior.
Bayesian Nash equilibria:
The equilibria that maximize each player’s expected value.
Perfect Bayesian equilibria(PBE):
Subgame perfect Nash equilibria(Subgame perfect equilibria) in incomplete information
Mixed strategy equilibria:
The correction of probabilities of strategies.
Subgame perfect Nash equilibria(Subgame perfect equilibria):
The definition in dynamic games and it represents a Nash equilibrium of every subgame of the original game.
Saturday 8 November 2008
Thirds eye!
Today's lecture was the first guest lecture in Sustainable Management class.
The lecturer was a human right lawer, and so energetic woman.
Her speech was very practical matters, such as "Annual report is always wrong". And I remembered my experience about studying economics of developing countries.
What I felt were
・Is it enough to think agriculture in Japan?
・how can/should Japanese agriculture contribute "sustainabiliuty"?
・What does it mean to promote Japanese agriculture in the world now?
It was so critical question, but I will find answers by when return Japan.
Anyway, I will work not only study.
The lecturer was a human right lawer, and so energetic woman.
Her speech was very practical matters, such as "Annual report is always wrong". And I remembered my experience about studying economics of developing countries.
What I felt were
・Is it enough to think agriculture in Japan?
・how can/should Japanese agriculture contribute "sustainabiliuty"?
・What does it mean to promote Japanese agriculture in the world now?
It was so critical question, but I will find answers by when return Japan.
Anyway, I will work not only study.
What is CSR?
Today's(Wednesday's) class was introduction of CSR.
The class started from a question "What is CSR?". Our definitions are "business going an extra mile(outside financial value) to add value to society", "refraing from activities activities that harm society", " add value to society beyond legal or duty"
And a question, "what is duty?" was following. In our defenition, it was "law about safety(employee, customer, environment)", "corperate law".
Last one was "what is society?" It was difficult to define. "people, stakeholder, and environment".
In some literature, CSR is difined as "value-driven" activity.
I was not so interested in the class because my corncern is a little bit different form sustainability. But I became understood that "sustainability" means not only environment but also poverish or developing countries, agriculture!
The class started from a question "What is CSR?". Our definitions are "business going an extra mile(outside financial value) to add value to society", "refraing from activities activities that harm society", " add value to society beyond legal or duty"
And a question, "what is duty?" was following. In our defenition, it was "law about safety(employee, customer, environment)", "corperate law".
Last one was "what is society?" It was difficult to define. "people, stakeholder, and environment".
In some literature, CSR is difined as "value-driven" activity.
I was not so interested in the class because my corncern is a little bit different form sustainability. But I became understood that "sustainability" means not only environment but also poverish or developing countries, agriculture!
Michel E. Porter and Mark R. Kramer, ”Strategy& Society, The Link Between Competitive Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility“
This is Porter’s view of CSR. The view has the same framework as Competitive Forces. He criticizes that many CSRs are not productive because firms pits business against society and CSRs are too general to exploit firms’ strengths.
Authors are claiming today’s justifications of CSR are meaningless and have no implication. These justifications are moral obligation, sustainability, license to operate, and reputation. Sometimes, sustainability works as reducing waste, but it is not enough. These mistakes occur from separate from independence of CSR from business unit.
Competitive context:
According to authors, competitive advantages of firm for society are categorized into four area:
1, the quantity and quality of available business inputs
2, the rule and incentives that govern competition
3, the size and sophistication of local demand
4, the local availability of supporting industries
Social issues:
Authors also say social activities divided into three:
1, Generic Social Issues
2, Value Chain Social Impact
3, Social Dimensions of Competitive Context
Step:
Finally, they say firms should take action in the following way:
1, Creating a corporate social agenda
-Responsive CSR, internal process(acting as good citizen, attuned to the evolving social concerns of stakeholders, and mitigating existing or anticipated adverse effects from business activities.
-Strategic CSR, outside-in prosess
2, integrating inside-out and outside-in practices
I think categories of CSR and analysis nowadays CSR is good, but others are not so. The example is all multinational companies. Its kind of boring because many firms is not MNCs. And it is most important, I think.
Friday 7 November 2008
Presentation!
Today’s class was EU presentation. This was the first one for me.
The problem is that this is the group presentation. Before presentation, I worried about we could do good presentation because our theme was completely the same as other groups, and we did not have any rehearsal, most of all, other members’ slide were so poor.
However, these worry was completely wrong. The presentation was really good!!! In my part, I stressed “We will show you different aspect” even if I was not sure my teammates prepared these topics. But they did.
Our presentation harmonized each other at high level. I appreciated them and I was appreciated by them, too. It was one of the best memory in SSE!
The problem is that this is the group presentation. Before presentation, I worried about we could do good presentation because our theme was completely the same as other groups, and we did not have any rehearsal, most of all, other members’ slide were so poor.
However, these worry was completely wrong. The presentation was really good!!! In my part, I stressed “We will show you different aspect” even if I was not sure my teammates prepared these topics. But they did.
Our presentation harmonized each other at high level. I appreciated them and I was appreciated by them, too. It was one of the best memory in SSE!
Thursday 6 November 2008
Avinash Dixit (2003)”On Mode of Economic Governance”
This is a study for explaining intermediate in repeated game. The paper explores a model of contract governance in large-group interactions by profit-maximizing private intermediation. In conclusion, it says four things:
Under self-government, the choice between honesty and cheating for each side is similar and produces different outcome. And scope for one-sided or two-sided private for-profit government.
A better public information can locally increase rather than lower the intermediary’s profit.
Punishment is better than information in terms of profitanbility.
Profitable intermediation is contested by monopoly.
Q How it set the strategy?
Q What is “And scope for one-sided or two-sided private for-profit government.”?
Q Is this summary right?
SANDVIK CODE OF CONDUCT
This is a general statement of a company. It is not interesting because most of notions are too ordinary to make difference. However, order of statement is interesting for me.
Compliance: responsibility of complaint, finance
Business operation: suppliers, labors, working conditions,
Environment: natural resources, prevent of contamination
Communities: cooperation with local communities, independent from politics, support culture
What is SANDVIK business?
Wednesday 5 November 2008
Debora L. Spar, Lane T. La Mure(2003)”The Power of Activism: Assesing the impact of NGOs on Grobal Business”
This is study about power of activists to MNCs. In the face of activism, MNCs choose one of three strategies: preemption, captiulation, and resistance.
The choices of MECs can be explain profit maximization because NGO impose cost MNCs. The cost differ among industry. Natural resource industry has higher cost than manufacturing one because of independence of the location.
In the face of activism, the role of top management is important. The self motivation of CEO is hard to explain. This study does not focus on CEO, but other thesis shows it is possible to get empirical answer of CEO’s motivation through relation between public account and high-profile of CEO’s. In future, it will be integrate with some theory.
Q, how it explain difference among industries’ strategies? And how to empirical?
Q, what is public account and high-profile?
Q, profit-maximization is truly one tool of analysis?
Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom, and Barry R. Weingast(1994)Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild
The aim of this paper is to interpret historical evidence to game theory. In the paper, it shows the mechanism of merchant guilds through framework of repeated game.
Surprisingly, game theory can explain history more clearly than old economic theory. Old theory, about cartel, can not explain facilitation of transaction by guilds. It only implies limiting trade for up grading price. On the other hand, repeated game can fully explain the expansion of guilds and their emerging.
It is also interesting two theories have same foundation but conclusions are different. And, later, cartel theory became true when trade were secured by bigger institutions and the interest of guilds became their merit.
Q, how to suppose the condition of act?
Q, what is main difference between game theory and cartel?
Q, why guilds change their role later? Has their interest changed?
Wesly Cragg(2000)”Human Rights and Business Ethics: Fashioning a New Social Contract”
The aim of this paper is to build “new social contract” . Because today, there are growing globalization and multinational corporations all over the world, and each government can not control fully their activities.
His suggestions are following:
1,New business frame work to promote increasing living standards by international trading. And also it is to prevent to transfer wealth from already rich to still poor.
2,New business frame work to meet CSR: human right, environmental act.
3,New frame works require partnership firms and governments. National and international governments should regulate and make foundation the environment such preserve fundamental human right and international commerce.
4,New contract needs monitoring system of civil society or private sector.
5,remind ourselves, “commerce without conscience is a formula for human exploitation not human development”
Q Is it true the needs of new contract?
Q What makes difference if the new contract is made?
Q What is main difference among firms, governments, and civil society?
His suggestions are following:
1,New business frame work to promote increasing living standards by international trading. And also it is to prevent to transfer wealth from already rich to still poor.
2,New business frame work to meet CSR: human right, environmental act.
3,New frame works require partnership firms and governments. National and international governments should regulate and make foundation the environment such preserve fundamental human right and international commerce.
4,New contract needs monitoring system of civil society or private sector.
5,remind ourselves, “commerce without conscience is a formula for human exploitation not human development”
Q Is it true the needs of new contract?
Q What makes difference if the new contract is made?
Q What is main difference among firms, governments, and civil society?
J.Ahlstrom, E. Sjostrom(2005)”CSOs and Business Partnerships: Strategies for Interaction”
The object of this study is collaboration of Cross-sectoral partnership. This study shows Civil Society Organizations(CSOs) are divided into four: Preservers, Protesters, Modifiers, and Scrutinizers. And only Preservers have strategy to make partnership with firms, compared with independent strategies of others.
For companies seeking partner in their activities, it is important to understand which category the CSO belongs. Preservers are usually found easily because they were mainly formed in 1800-1970s and established their brand.
The structure of the paper is clear, and English is very easy to understand. But I do not think the category is right, category itself is true but strategy might be different from each others.
Q, why 4 kinds of CSOs take different strategy?
Q, what is partnership? Money?HR?
Q what is successful CSO?
K.S. Nilsson(2004)”The (Ir)responsible Organization―Argumentative Themes in the Literature on Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Citizenshi
K.S. Nilsson(2004)”The (Ir)responsible Organization―Argumentative Themes in the Literature on Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Citizenship
This is the study for CSR or Corporate Citizenship(CC). this paper arranged arguments that were taken place in this matter. The discussion in the paper shows two aspects of CSR and CC: conflict of interest between opponents and proponents regarding merit and drawbacks of CSE and CC. Clashes are caused by sub-groups.
However, this paper also shows CSR and CC are influenced by institutional form of organization. And the social activities end up cementing, rather than changing, hypothesis of profit maximization.
Q what is CSR and CC?
Q what is the difference of Institutional setting?
Q why profit maximization is bad( from the view of author)?
This is the study for CSR or Corporate Citizenship(CC). this paper arranged arguments that were taken place in this matter. The discussion in the paper shows two aspects of CSR and CC: conflict of interest between opponents and proponents regarding merit and drawbacks of CSE and CC. Clashes are caused by sub-groups.
However, this paper also shows CSR and CC are influenced by institutional form of organization. And the social activities end up cementing, rather than changing, hypothesis of profit maximization.
Q what is CSR and CC?
Q what is the difference of Institutional setting?
Q why profit maximization is bad( from the view of author)?
Tuesday 4 November 2008
EU presentation
Today’s class was EU presentation. Funny thing is that , one group has completely same topic as us.
The point of presentation were: eye contact, eyesight(slide or presenter), self-confidence, and harmonization of tension!
After presentation, we had a meeting about presentation. It was so fun because the members were great!!!
I am looking forward to presentation!!!
The point of presentation were: eye contact, eyesight(slide or presenter), self-confidence, and harmonization of tension!
After presentation, we had a meeting about presentation. It was so fun because the members were great!!!
I am looking forward to presentation!!!
Repeated game and governnance
Today’s class was so hard to follow. I did not know why, but I have understood the reason, lack of vocabulary.
Any way, today’s class was also interesting, as I feel now. Today’s topics were three: Institutional Change, Repeated Games, Organization of Punishment.
Institutional Change:
Expand Hold-up model to be followed one simple game. And assume connection between interactions is all in the players’ heads. In the game, there are many strategies. And the strategies can be written as (I, if E the T; if NE the T).
Repeated Games:
To repeat the institutional change, there is difference between outcome of finite game and infinite game. But, here, we calculate payoffs of infinite game. This shows possible value of δ(=discount factor), r(=immediate cost of punish), p(=imposed cost of robber).
Organization of punishment:
This is indication for revenge and third party’s enforcement to change rules. Of course, it is possible to reach effective equilibrium by revenge, but professional enforcement is reasonable because of its scale merit. It means professional enforcer easily sustain natural monopoly. And calculation shows the value of f(=fee for enforcer).
These shows the lessons: Better governance required several players changing their worldview, memory of past events, foresight that current actions will be remembered and shape behavior in the future. However, in the simple stationary environments, cooperation requires only a little memory and no foresight. Of course more complex situation needs more memory and anticipation or communications.
Any way, today’s class was also interesting, as I feel now. Today’s topics were three: Institutional Change, Repeated Games, Organization of Punishment.
Institutional Change:
Expand Hold-up model to be followed one simple game. And assume connection between interactions is all in the players’ heads. In the game, there are many strategies. And the strategies can be written as (I, if E the T; if NE the T).
Repeated Games:
To repeat the institutional change, there is difference between outcome of finite game and infinite game. But, here, we calculate payoffs of infinite game. This shows possible value of δ(=discount factor), r(=immediate cost of punish), p(=imposed cost of robber).
Organization of punishment:
This is indication for revenge and third party’s enforcement to change rules. Of course, it is possible to reach effective equilibrium by revenge, but professional enforcement is reasonable because of its scale merit. It means professional enforcer easily sustain natural monopoly. And calculation shows the value of f(=fee for enforcer).
These shows the lessons: Better governance required several players changing their worldview, memory of past events, foresight that current actions will be remembered and shape behavior in the future. However, in the simple stationary environments, cooperation requires only a little memory and no foresight. Of course more complex situation needs more memory and anticipation or communications.
Monday 3 November 2008
M.R. Garfinkel and S. Skaperdas (2006): Economics of Conflict: An Overview, in T. Sandler and K. Hartley(eds.): Handbook of Defense Economics volⅡ(for
This is a chapter of a book. The central focus of this chapter is to identify the effects of conflict on economics outcomes. The examination in the paper shows conflict is a natural consequence of basic economic assumptions. And the conflicts involves costs are important, and effects allocation of resources.
Q
-details implication?
-governments roles
Q
-details implication?
-governments roles
S.Skaperdas(1992):”Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights
This is a paper to examine interaction without property rights. The paper sets two patterns: first is possibility of cooperation and its characteristics is static setting. When the agents cooperate, conflict is ineffective. It is when win probabilities are significantly different only for large arm differentials and, in addition, when their marginal production is similar. Cooperation can be consistent with domination of one party.
As for power, the more resources agent has, the less power it has because of less productibity.
The elements of coalition are difficult to identify. It can be found only by drastic simplification.
Q
-what is “consistent with domination”?
-what is second?
-how to set environment?
As for power, the more resources agent has, the less power it has because of less productibity.
The elements of coalition are difficult to identify. It can be found only by drastic simplification.
Q
-what is “consistent with domination”?
-what is second?
-how to set environment?
Bayesian Equilibrium
Today’s class was so short. But it was so interesting!
The contents of the class were three: multi-stage games and subgame perfection, Bayesian Equilibrium, and Anarchy economy.
Multi-stage games:
The games are where players act in turns. In the class setting, there were two Nash equilibria. But only one of them was reasonable. This subgame perfection can be checked by backward induction.
Bayesian Equilibrium:
We often can not know each other’s payoff because we do not always know other’s payoff and non-monetary issues. But if we assume each player can assign probability distribution to other’s payoffs, we can use the concept of Nash equilibrium. This is Bayesian Equilibrium. In Bayesian Equilibrium, players choose best strategy according to (other’s payoff probability)・(its payoff).
Anarchy economy:
This is opposition concept of perfect market. There are two players. Each one has one unit of labor. They can produce food and weapons. Weapons are used to protect and acquire foods. Only food consumption is valued. Suppose “might(=power) is right”, whoever has most weapons takes all food, the equilibrium outcome is that both invest all labor for weapons.
Following is lecture notes:
If food consumption is decided proportion of weapons( vi=yi/y1+y2*X), equilibria is y1=12=y*, because of symmetricity????
The contents of the class were three: multi-stage games and subgame perfection, Bayesian Equilibrium, and Anarchy economy.
Multi-stage games:
The games are where players act in turns. In the class setting, there were two Nash equilibria. But only one of them was reasonable. This subgame perfection can be checked by backward induction.
Bayesian Equilibrium:
We often can not know each other’s payoff because we do not always know other’s payoff and non-monetary issues. But if we assume each player can assign probability distribution to other’s payoffs, we can use the concept of Nash equilibrium. This is Bayesian Equilibrium. In Bayesian Equilibrium, players choose best strategy according to (other’s payoff probability)・(its payoff).
Anarchy economy:
This is opposition concept of perfect market. There are two players. Each one has one unit of labor. They can produce food and weapons. Weapons are used to protect and acquire foods. Only food consumption is valued. Suppose “might(=power) is right”, whoever has most weapons takes all food, the equilibrium outcome is that both invest all labor for weapons.
Following is lecture notes:
If food consumption is decided proportion of weapons( vi=yi/y1+y2*X), equilibria is y1=12=y*, because of symmetricity????
Lin Lerpold, Harry Barkema, Anders Sjoman,(2008) “Hand in Hand in India”
This is a case of SSE. It describes Hand in Hand, a NGO of India mainly donated by Swedish rich, and show its history and issues for the future.
Hand in Hand is one of the successful NGOs. But as its expansion, three problems occurred. First is business model. It means how to cut the cost of operation, and how to manage its expenditure thorough donation or its earnings of its activity. Second is human resources. NGOs usually needs a lot of skill because they have to get into different environment: different culture, value, language, and motivations. It needs a lot of experience and skills even if its salary is not better than companies. The paper indicates the competition of talented people with the booming industries of India. Last is vision. NGO’s vision has no limit, because their missions are universal. However, they should limit their universal mission because of the cost. If they expands their activity infinitely, they spend up their resources because they can not earn money freely by its activities.
In my opinion, NGO’s or NPO’s activities, except for international activities, should be done by its governments. In the first place, keeping basic life of people is completely governmental role because any governments are run by tax; the money from nation for nation. I suggest NGOs and NPOs should cooperate with the government and transfer.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
